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UNITED STATES V JOHNSON. REFORMULATING THE
RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court has struggled with the issue of retroactivity
since the Court's recognition in Linkletter v. WalkerI that not all new con-
stitutional rules of procedure will operate retroactively to benefit crimi-
nal defendants tried before the new rule is announced. In United States v.
Johnson,2 the Court for the first time reconsidered the Linklelter Court's
balancing test for resolving retroactivity questions and adopted a new
approach in cases involving the fourth amendment exclusionary rule.3
The Court in Johnson acknowledged that its application of the tradi-
tional test in the years following Linkletter resulted in incompatible deci-
sions and unequal treatment of similarly situated defendants. 4 In an
attempt to rectify these problems, the Johnson Court endorsed, in part,
the retroactivity approach that Justice Harlan had proposed in prior
dissenting opinions. 5
The Johnson Court, however, neglected to remedy the cause of the
problems that plagued the Linkletter rule; it failed to set forth a princi-
pled purpose or theory to guide judicial resolution of retroactivity
problems. Since the inception of the doctrine, the Justices have been
unable to agree on the purposes or policy concerns that should guide the
Court's retroactivity analysis. Nor have they concurred on an alternate,
jurisprudential rationale for the form of the retroactivity doctrine. The
Johnson analysis evidences another compromise among members of the
Court who seek a common result for different reasons.6 As a conse-
quence, the new retroactivity analysis is not only internally inconsistent
and doctrinally confusing, it is also of limited utility in forecasting the
future course of retroactivity law. Examination of the Johnson decision
makes clear only one thing: the Court must come to some explicit agree-
ment on a guiding purpose or rationale for its retroactivity doctrine or it
will suffer continued charges of unprincipled decisionmaking and une-
qual protection.
1 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
2 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
3 See infra notes 99-124 and accompanying text.
4 See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 548 (1982); see also infra notes 28-31, 37-43
and accompanying text.
5 SeeJohnson, 457 U.S. at 562; see a/so infa notes 53-81 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Harlan's retroactivity approach).
6 See zifa notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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I
BACKGROUND
A retroactivity issue arises in the criminal context when the Court
lays down a new constitutional procedural rule that overrules or sub-
stantially departs from prior precedent. The Court must decide who
among three classes of litigants will receive the benefit of the new protec-
tion: (1) litigants in past and pending cases; (2) the litigants in the case
that established the new rule; and (3) future litigants (litigants whose
cases have not yet begun). Courts have resolved the retroactivity issue
by applying rules retroactively, nonretroactively, or prospectively. A ret-
roactive ruling applies to all cases before the court; past, present, or fu-
ture litigants receive the benefit of the new rule. A nonretroactive7 ruling
affects the parties in the rule-changing case, litigants whose cases began
before the date of the rule-changing decision but in whose cases the
practice or condition found unconstitutional occurred after the rule-
changing decision,8 and future litigants. A prospective ruling 9 applies to
7 Cf Rossum, New Rights and Old Wrongs.: The Supreme Court and the Problem of Retroactiv-
ity, 23 EMORY L.J. 381, 381 n.2 (1974) ("nonretroactive" operation referred to as "'limited'
retroactive effect").
8 This discussion assumes for the sake of clarity that the Court would determine who
among past litigants would receive the nonretroactive benefit of a new rule by reference to
whether the date of the constitutional violation covered by the new rule occurred before or
after the announcement of the new rule. The Court, however, has been inconsistent in deter-
mining the cutoff point beyond which new rulings become effective. It has, at various times,
employed four different points of departure:
(1) The new rule is denied only to persons whose convictions have become final prior to the
date of the new rule's decision. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (holding Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending fourth amendment exclusionary rule to states) inap-
plicable to convictions that became final before Mapp was decided); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S.
406 (1966) (holding Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (prohibiting prosecutor from
commenting adversely on defendant's failure to testify) not applicable to judgments final
before date Gri&4m was decided).
(2) The new rule is denied to all persons whose trials began before the date of the new
decision, whether or not their convictions have become final. See, e.g., Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U.S. 719 (1966) (holding Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) and Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) applicable only to cases in which the trial began after the date of
Escobedo and Miranda); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (per curiam) (holding rights
to trial granted in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968), applicable only to cases in which the trial began after date of Bloom and Duncan).
(3) The new rule is denied to all persons in whose cases the constitutional violation, covered
by the new rule occurred before the date of the new decision, whether or not their convictions
have become final. See, e.g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (holding Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (invalidating warrantless automobile searches
conducted by roving border patrol agents without probable cause) applicable only to cases in
which search occurred after date of Almeida-Sanchez decision); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967) (holding United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967) (requiring exclusion of identification evidence secured in absence of counsel)
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pending cases in which the constitutional violation occurred after the
date of the rule-changing case' ° and to future cases, but not to the par-
ties in the rule-changing case. t I
In determining the classes of defendants to which a new rule should
apply, courts have traditionally balanced the competing interests of the
litigants and the state, using the factors set out by the Supreme Court in
Linkleller v. Walker. 12
A. The Lzzkletter Test
Prior to the decision of Linkletter v. Walker in 1965, the Supreme
Court gave retroactive effect to all constitutional rules of criminal proce-
dure.' 3 Any criminal defendant directly appealing a conviction or col-
applicable only to cases involving confrontations after date of Wade and Gilbert decisions).
(4) The new rule is denied to all persons, whether on direct appeal or collaterally attack-
ing a final judgment, in whose cases the illegal evidence was introduced before the date of the
decision that declared it illegal. See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (holding
fourth amendment rule of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) applicable only to cases
in which prosecution seeks to introduce fruits of electronic surveillance obtained without war-
rant after date of Katz decision); Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968) (holding fourth amend-
ment rule of Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968) applicable only to cases in which evidence
seized in violation of § 605 of Federal Communications Act was introduced after date of Lee
decision).
See generally Hasler, Retroactioty Rethought." The Hidden Costs, 24 ME. L. R'Ev. 1, 29-32 (1972);
Comment, Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Application of Linkletter, 16 J. PUB. L.
193, 206-08 (1967).
Recently, the Court seems to have adopted the most logical cutoff point: the date of the
violation of constitutional rights. See, e.g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); see
also Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivio." A Critique anda Proposal, 61 VA. L. REV. 1557, 1604
(1975).
9 The Supreme Court seldom has granted a case true prospective application by deny-
ing the benefit of the decision to the litigant in the rule-changing case. See in/ra notes 13, 37
and accompanying text. More frequently, the Court mislabels a holding as prospective when
it is in fact nonretroactive in effect. See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("At least the Court should not say as respects Katz that it is given
'wholly prospective application,' when it was made retroactive in his case."); Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 732 (1966) (although Court applied Escobedo and Miranda rules to de-
fendants in those ground-breaking cases, it held new procedural rules "prospective [in] appli-
cation only").
10 For the purposes of simplicity, the discussion is again premised on the Court's use of
the date of the constitutional violation as its reference point. See supra note 8.
11 See generaly Beytagh, supra note 8, at 1557; Rossum, supra note 7, at 381 n.2.
12 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
13 See id at 628 ("It is true that heretofore, without discussion, we have applied new
constitutional rules to cases finalized before the promulgation of the rule."). Although no
majority opinion had addressed the issue prior to Linkletter, individual Justices had suggested
that certain new constitutional holdings be applied prospectively or nonretroactively. See,
e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 349-40 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Eskridge v. Wash-
ington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214, 216 (1958) (Harlan & Whittaker, JJ., dissenting); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 25-26 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For an excellent treatment of
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laterally attacking 14 a final judgment 5 was entitled to the benefit of a
new constitutional protection.' 6 In Linkletter, the Court broke with this
the pre-Linkletter retroactivity case law, see Note, Limitation ofJudicial Decisions to Prospective
Operation, 46 IOWA L. REv. 600 (1960-61) [hereinafter cited as Note, Limitation ]; Note, Prospec-
tive Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Note, Prospective Overruling].
Professor Mishkin contends that the Court's per se retroactivity doctrine stemmed from
the declaratory theory of jurisprudence. "[W]hatever the Court now holds to be the law of
the Constitution becomes 'what has always been the law'-even if the new holding overrules
an earlier decision of the Court." Mishkin, The Supreme Court 1964 Term-Foreword The High
Court, The Great Writ, and The Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REv. 56, 57 (1965).
The theory's initial premise is that the law exists independently ofjudicial decisions. Thus, a
court's function is to "discover" this absolute law and once it has been found, to maintain and
expand the old law, not to pronounce new law. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES bk. I
*69-70 (W. Hammond ed. 1890). When precedent is overruled, "it is declared, not that such
a sentence was badlaw, but that it wasnot law." Id at *70 (emphasis in original). The declar-
atory theory therefore compels retroactive operation for all judicial decisions. This theory
prevailed in the United States where it was generally assumed that all judicial decisions oper-
ated retroactively. See, e.g., Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886). For a fuller discus-
sion of this theory as it relates to retroactivity, see Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective
Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1960); Mishkin, supra, at 57-59; Rossum, supra note 7, at 381-
98; Note, Prospective Overruling, supra at 907-15.
Even before the Supreme Court repudiated this declaratory theory in Linkletter, courts
had been making exceptions to the general rule of retroactivity in nonconstitutional cases
where "the plainest principles of justice" demanded prospectivity. Note, Limitation, supra at
603 n.16. Courts primarily limited decisions invalidating state statutes or overruling estab-
lished common law doctrines to prospective application to avoid damaging those who had
justifiably relied on prior authority. See, e.g., Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.)
175 (1863) (issue of municipal bonds, valid under judicial decisions existing when issued,
remained valid after those judicial decisions were overruled); State v. Jones, 44 N.M. 623, 107
P.2d 324 (1940) (conduct formerly determined innocent held criminal but decision prospec-
tive in effect); Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio 445 (1948) (divorces, valid when granted by legis-
lature, remained valid after court found that legislature had no power to grant them). The
Supreme Court upheld a state court's power to prospectively overrule prior decisions, stating
that the "federal constitution has no voice upon the subject." Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Ref.
Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932).
14 Defendants may petition the Court to reverse their convictions, citing newly recog-
nized constitutional requirements, either by seeking direct review of their nonfinal judgments
(appeal or certiorari) or by collaterally attacking their final judgments (habeas corpus or
motion to vacate judgment). Because the different avenues of collateral attack available to
state and federal prisoners are virtually identical (a state prisoner's habeas action under 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (1976) and a federal prisoner's motion to vacate judgment under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1976)), this Note will refer to both as habeas corpus. See Mackey v. United States,
401 U.S. 667, 681 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962).
15 A judgment is final when a conviction is rendered, the availability of appeal is ex-
hausted, and the time for petition for certiorari has elapsed. See United States v. Johnson, 457
U.S. 537, 542 n.8 (1982) (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 n.5 (1965)).
16 This Note is concerned with the retroactivity issue as it almost always arises-in the
context of decisions expanding constitutional rights. Courts, however, have considered the is-
sue in connection with new rules that narrow previously recognized fourth amendment rights.
Because retroactive treatment ofsuch cases does not conflict with the deterrent purpose of the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule or the integrity of the fact-finding process, these deci-
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tradition by holding the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio ,7 inapplicable
to convictions that had become final before the date of the Mapp deci-
sion.' 8 The Linkletter Court declared that "the Constitution neither pro-
hibits nor requires retrospective effect"' 9 for new constitutional rules. It
then concluded that in each case, a court must resolve the temporal con-
flict of law question by considering three factors: (1) the new rule's in-
tended purpose and the efficacy of retroactive application of the rule in
furthering that purpose (the "purpose factor");20 (2) the extent of reli-
sions have generally received retroactive effect. Even though an officer in such cases acts in
violation of a rule that the Court had not yet abandoned, "to suppress [the fruits of the
violation] in the name of deterrence would make sense only if there was some reason to be-
lieve that otherwise police might violate other Supreme Court decisions in the expectation
that the Court would abandon them." 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 11.5(d) (1978);
see, e.g., Maine v. Patten, 457 U.S. 1114 (1982) (vacating judgment of Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine based on portion of Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981), overruled in
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 919 (1982), and remanding for consideration in light of Ross);
United States v. Martin, 690 F.2d 416, 421 n.4 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying Ross retroactively
stating: "Generally, we must apply a Supreme Court decision construing the Fourth Amend-
ment retroactively to all convictions that were not yet final when the decision was ren-
dered."); Stocker v. Hutto, 547 F.2d 437 (8th Cir. 1977) (applying retroactively Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)); Taylor v. Arizona, 471 F.2d 848 (9th Cir.) (applying retroac-
tively Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (rejecting "mere evidence" rule of Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921))),cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1130 (1972); cf Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 495 n.38 (1976) (denying prospective effect to holding that federal courts are not
constitutionally required to apply exclusionary rule on habeas review of fourth amendment
claim if state prisoner had full and fair opportunity to litigate fourth amendment claim on
direct review).
17 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
18 In Linkletter, the petitioner sought federal habeas corpus relief from a state conviction
based on unconstitutionally seized evidence. Linkletter claimed that Mapp, which extended
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to the states, operated to nullify his conviction. Al-
though the Court had already applied the Mapp rule to cases on direct review in which the
evidence had been illegally seized before the date of the Mapp decision, see Stoner v. Califor-
nia, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963); Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23 (1963), it declined to apply the new rule to Linkletter's claim because his conviction had
become final before Mapp was decided. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 622.
19 381 U.S. at 629.
20 Id at 636. In Linkletter, the Court found that the prime purpose of the Mapp exclu-
sionary rule, deterrence of illegal police actions, would not be advanced by making the rule
retroactive. The Court stated that "[t]he misconduct of the police prior to Mapp has already
occurred and will not be corrected by releasing the prisoners involved. . . . [T]he ruptured
privacy of the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too late."
Linkletter, 318 U.S. at 637.
Justice Black, in dissent, objected to the Court's characterization of the Mapp rule as "a
mere punishing rod to be applied to law enforcement officers." Linkletler, 381 U.S. at 649
(Black, J., dissenting). Black charged that in denying that the rule conferred on Mapp a right
to be free of unconstitutional searches, the Court was departing from prior precedent and
impermissibly engaging in legislation. Id at 649; see airo Currier, Time and Change in Judge-
Made Law: Prospective Overmling, 51 VA. L. REv. 201, 268 (1965).
The Court has since made clear, however, that "the exclusionary rule is a judicially
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ance by law enforcement authorities on now invalid precedent (the "re-
liance factor"); 2' and (3) the effect of retroactive application on the
administration of justice (the "effect factor"). 22
B. Post-Link/etter Application of the Link/etter Test
In the cases following Link/etter, the Court's retroactivity analysis
focused primarily on the purpose factor, which represented the interests
of individual litigants seeking the benefit of a new decision. In making
its purpose inquiry, the Court weighed the degree to which the new rule
was designed to ensure "the fairness of the trial-the very integrity of
the fact-finding process." 23 The Court generally gave retroactive effect
to new constitutional rules aimed principally at eliminating conduct or
conditions that "substantially" impaired a trial's truth-finding function
and thereby raised questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in
past trials.2
4
created remedy rather than a personal constitutional right." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
494 n.37 (1976). One commentator adds that even if the exclusionary rule creates a right to
the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence, once the Court decides to differentiate
among constitutional rights, no better distinction exists than one based on a purpose inquiry.
See Haddad, "Retroactioiy Should Be Rethought'- A Callfor the End of the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J.
CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScL 417 (1969).
21 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965). The Court has not been clear in set-
ting forth what kind of reliance it deems sufficient to tip the scales toward retroactivity. Some
cases distinguish between reliance upon a previous decision that the Court has consistently
upheld and less justified reliance upon decisions that the Court has continually weakened so
that the later, overruling decision was "foreshadowed." See id at 637; see also Tehan v. Shott,
382 U.S. 406, 417 (1966). Later cases, however, found justifiable reliance based only upon the
previous refusal of the Court to condemn certain police practices, see, e.g., Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), and reliance upon a previous decision clearly eroded by subse-
quent holdings, see, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969). See generally Comment,
supra note 8, at 204-05.
22 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636. Among the considerations that the Court weighed in eval-
uating the effect factor were: the possibility that hearings would be required on evidence that
has been lost or destroyed; the staleness of the evidence and the unavailability of witnesses;
the number of convictions that would have to be nullified; and the burden that retrials would
place on the court calendar. Id. at 637; see Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 418-19 (1966);
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 731 (1966).
23 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628 n.13, 639 & n.20 (1965). The Linkletter Court
used this purpose inquiry to justify earlier cases in which new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure had been applied retroactively, purportedly because their purpose was to ensure
the reliability of the verdict. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (denial of
right to counsel); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (denial of full appeal). However,
because the Court had never debated the issue before Link/letter, see supra note 13, the Court
had not originally predicated the retroactivity of these holdings on a purpose determination.
This language from Linkletter has become the standard for the balancing test's purpose factor.
The Court phrased the standard in a variety of ways. See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S.
323, 329 n.6 (1980).
24 See Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971) (plurality opinion) ("Neither
good-faith reliance by state or federal authorities on prior constitutional law or accepted prac-
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The Court stated that courts should weigh heavily the state's inter-
est, embodied in the reliance2 5 and effect 26 factors, only when the new
tices nor severe impact on the administration of justice has sufficed to require prospective
application in these circumstances."). The Court in Williams denied retroactive operation to
its decision in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), because the Chimel rule, which
narrowed the scope of permissible searches incident to arrest, was not primarily directed at
ensuring the reliability of the evidence seized. See also Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314
(1969) (per curiam) (giving retroactive effect to Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968)); Arsen-
ault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968) (per curiam) (giving retroactive effect to right to
counsel provided in White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963)); McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2
(1968) (per curiam) (giving retroactive effect to right to counsel provided in Mempa v. Rhay,
389 U.S. 128 (1967)); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968) (per curiam) (giving retroactive
effect to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)).
The Court, however, has also found nonretroactive rules that it acknowledged to be
aimed in part at preserving the reliability of the truth-finding process. See, e.g., Johnson v.
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730 (1966) (Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), "guard against the possibility of unreliable statements in
every instance of in-custody interrogation" but were denied retroactive effect); Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298 (1967) ("Although the [United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967),
and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967),] rules also are aimed at avoiding unfairness at
the trial by enhancing the reliability of the fact-finding process in the area of identification
evidence." Court held those rules nonretroactive). See general( Hasler, supra note 8, at 8-11.
The Court has attempted to reconcile these cases, stating:
[W]e have recognized that the extent to which the purpose of a new constitu-
tional rule requires its retroactive application "is necessarily one of degree."
. ..Constitutional protections are frequently fashioned to serve multiple
ends; while a new standard may marginally implicate the reliability and in-
tegrity of the fact finding process, it may have been designed primarily to
foster other, equally fundamental values in our system ofjurisprudence ....
In short, "[t]he extent to which a condemned practice infects the integrity of
the truth-determining process at trial is a 'question of probabilities.' "
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298 (1967) (quoting Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729
(1966)).
25 See supra note 21. The most common justification for denying retroactive effect to new
decisions is that retroactivity might harm those who justifiably relied on prior precedents. See
Note, Limitation, supra note 13, at 601. Commentators argue, however, that in the context of
new rules of criminal procedure, the reliance factor should not be considered because it is not
clear exactly who would be harmed by complete retroactivity. As one commentator noted:
[I]t is fair to ask, what injury will result from disregard of reliance? Judges
and law enforcement officers may be frustrated and miffed, but certainly not
injured nor punished for their misplaced reliance. . . .Societal interests in
protecting innocent citizens from "dangerous men" may be affected, but once
again, might not more serious evils result from the society's disregard for lib-
erty and equality and the dictates of its own laws?
Rossum, supra note 7, at 398-99; see also Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability and Due Process.- A
Repl to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CHi. L. REV. 719, 756 (1966).
Critics also argue that a state's reliance on previous doctrines should never be a sufficient
reason for keeping in jail prisoners who were convicted because of the lawless conduct of state
officials. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 652 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); Mishkin,
supra note 13, at 73. This argument is compelling on the facts of Linkletter, where police
officers knew that the practice was proscribed but relied upon pre-AMapp precedent that state
convictions would not be reversed because the evidence obtained in violation of the constitu-
tion was used at trial. The state's reliance on the pre-Mapp inapplicability of the exclusionary
rule to the states was justified, but it is scarcely a compelling reason to find that Linkletter,
1983] RETROACTIVITY
rule would not substantially affect the reliability of the verdict and
when retroactive application was unnecessary to further the rule's in-
tended purpose.27 The inconsistent body of retroactivity case law, how-
ever, indicates that the Court applied this formula at best unevenly.
2 8
Indeed, the Court seemed to accord new constitutional rules a presump-
tion of nonretroactivity, particularly in the fourth amendment area, un-
less the purpose factor unequivocally required retroactive application of
the rule. 29 Dissenting Justices and commentators repeatedly criticized
the Court's inconsistent application of the Link/etter factors. 30 They
whose constitutional rights were knowingly violated, cannot retroactively challenge his con-
viction. See Mishkin, supra note 13, at 73. But see Rossum, supra note 7, at 399 (defending use
of reliance factor as "respectable and necessary," although easily misused).
26 See supra note 22. Dissenting Justices and commentators have objected to considera-
tion of the effect on judicial administration because it goes against basic principles for the
Court to allow "mere expense and inconvenience . . . to prevail over personal liberty."
Torcia & King, The Mirage of Retroactivity and Changing Constitutional Concepts, 66 DICK. L. REV.
269, 287 (1962); see Mallamud, Prospective Limitation and the Rights of the Accused, 56 IoWA L.
REv. 321, 347 (1970); Mishkin, supra note 13, at 73. But see Rossum, supra note 7, at 399
(arguing that where new rule does not affect reliability of verdict, retroactivity may impair
state's ability to reconvict guilty and handicap development of constitutional law by over-
taxing limited resources of judges, attorneys, and policemen).
27 See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249, 251 (1969). But see supra note 24; infra
notes 30-3 1.
28 Although the Court clearly indicated that if the purpose factor mandated retroactiv-
ity, the reliance and effect factors would not be considered, see, e.g., Williams v. United States,
401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969), it has allowed these
latter two factors to outweigh the purpose factor, see, e.g., DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631
(1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966);see
also supra note 24. More often, the Court simply has stated, without analysis, its conclusion
that all three factors point toward nonretroactivity, see, e.g., Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47
(1973) (holding nonretroactive North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (due process
limitations imposed to guard against vindictiveness in resentencing after retrial)); Adams v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972) (holding nonretroactive Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970)
(preliminary hearing is critical stage of criminal process at which accused is constitutionally
entitled to assistance of counsel)), or that the purpose factor requires that the new rule receive
retroactive application, see, e.g., Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968); Ivan v. City of New
York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972) (per curiam) (holding retroactive In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970) (proof beyond reasonable doubt is essential to due process when juvenile tried for act
that would be criminal if committed by adult)).
29 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729-
30 (1966); Hasler, supra note 8, at 11-13.
30 See Beytagh, supra note 8, at 1604-05 ("The Court has also been criticized for inconsis-
tent application of its stated criteria. . . . This criticism appears to be justified. The Court
has never provided the lower courts or practitioners with a thoughtful evaluation of the rela-
tive significance of the criteria."); Rossum, supra note 7, at 402-03 ("[Tlhe Court has deviated
from its announced and avowed criteria. Despite continued verbal obeisance to them, it has
in practice broken free of their restraints."); see also United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537,
544 (1982); Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 61-63 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); infia notes
61-63 and accompanying text (Justice Harlan's views). But see United States v. Johnson, 457
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called for a formula for weighing the factors that the Court would ad-
here to in practice as well as in theory.3 1
The Court in Link/elter used the procedural posture of the litigant to
determine who among past litigants would be in the nonretroactive class
benefiting from the new rule.3 2 Having applied the Mapp rule prior to
Linkletter in cases on direct review in which evidence had been illegally
seized before the date of the Mapp decision, the Court continued to al-
low litigants in these cases the benefit of Mapp without restriction.3 3 It
declined to apply the new rule to Linkletter's claim, however, because
he was collaterally attacking a conviction that had become final before
Mapp was decided.3 4 The Court in later cases discarded this distinction
between persons whose convictions were final and those whose convic-
U.S. 537, 566-67 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (finding Court's doctrine clearly and consist-
ently applied).
Professor Beytagh attributes much of this difficulty to the "erratic procedural way in
which the Court has handled retroactivity/prospectivity questions." Beytagh, supra note 8,
1605, 1617-25; see also infra note 31. Professor Hasler, however, attributes the inconsistencies
to the Court's failure to be frank about the actual purpose of the doctrine, which is to facili-
tate change in the rules of criminal procedure. See Hasler, supra note 8, at 6.
Attempts have been made to reconcile the retroactivity case law, or at least to categorize
it. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 458-59 n.4 (1974) (Brennan, J., concurring); United
States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 728 (1971) (holding nonretroactive
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62
(1968) (gamblers had fifth amendment right to remain silent despite statutory requirement
that they submit reports that could incriminate them)) (appendix to Brennan, J., concurring);
Sabo, Retroactivity in Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court as Monday Morning Quarterback, 24 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 139 (1969).
31 Commentators also take issue with the way in which the Court accepts and an-
nounces retroactivity cases. As Professor Beytagh explains:
Sometimes the Court has given plenary consideration to the question in a case
coming to it some time after the law-changing decision. [See, e.g., Tehan v.
Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).] Some-
times it has decided the matter in summary fashion, without briefing or argu-
ment, and has written only a cryptic per curiam opinion that often hides as
much as it discloses about the Court's reasoning. [See, e.g., Mack v.
Oklahoma, 103 S. Ct. 201 (1982); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968).] At
other times the Court has announced its resolution of the retroactiv-
ity/prospectivity question in the very case announcing the new constitutional
rule, but often in an equally summary manner. [See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972).]
Beytagh, supra note 8, at 1605 (footnotes omitted).
Professor Beytagh advocates that the Court formally adopt a new procedural mechanism
for dealing with the retroactivity question. Id at 1619-25; see also Hasler, supra note 8, at 20,
20-23 ("The methods by which the retroactivity decisions are selected for review [and an-
nounced] foster further uncertaintes [sic].").
32 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 (1965); see supra notes 8, 18. The Court main-
tained tlis distinction in Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
33 See supra note 18.
34 See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 (1965).
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tions were at various stages of trial and direct review.35 It expanded the
class of persons excluded from the nonretroactive benefit of a rule to
include litigants on direct appeal in whose cases the constitutional viola-
tion occurred before the date of the new decision as well as litigants
seeking to collaterally attack judgments that had become final before
the date of the new decision. 36
Although the Supreme Court extended the scope of nonretroactiv-
ity in post-Link/etter cases to permissibly exclude persons on direct ap-
peal from a new rule's protection, it refused to exclude the litigant in the
rule-changing case. Thus, although willing to expand the nonretroac-
tivity of new rules, the Court was unwilling to make them purely pro-
spective in application.37  The Court recognized the inequality of
allowing the defendant in the rule-changing case to benefit from the
new rule while denying the rule's protection to other similarly situated
defendants who were not fortunate enough to be selected as the vehicles
for announcement of the new rule.3 8 The Court justified this doctrine
and its attendant inequality as an unavoidable consequence of the arti-
cle III requirement that the Court resolve "actual cases and controver-
sies" so that "constitutional adjudications not stand as mere dictum.13 9
35 "We. . .conclude that. . . no distinction is justified between convictions now final,
as in the instant case, and convictions at various stages of trial and direct review." Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300 (1967).
36 See, e.g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 535 n.5 (1975); Williams v. United
States, 401 U.S. 646, 651-52 (1971) (plurality opinion) ("Nor have we accepted as a dividing
line the suggested distinction between cases on direct review and those arising on collateral
attack."); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 732 (1966); supra note 8. But see United States
v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 562 (1982) (readopting distinction); infra notes 100-15 and accom-
panying text.
37 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. But see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
490 (1972) (establishing basic requirements applicable only to "future revocations of parole").
38 As Justice Douglas explained in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969):
The most notorious example is Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, where, as I
recall, some 80 cases were presented raising the same question. We took four
of them and held the rest and then disposed of each of the four, applying the
new procedural rule retroactively [to them]. But as respects the rest of the
pending cases we denied any relief [in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719
(1966)].
Id. at 255-56 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
39 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967); see a/so Desist v. United States, 394 U.S.
244, 254-55 n.24 (1969). The Court reasoned that if the overruling decision is prospectively
applied, the overruling language is mere dicta. Furthermore, the decision may be interpreted
as an advisory opinion, forbidden the Court by article III of the Constitution.
Critics discount the validity of the article III argument. Justice Douglas, dissenting in
Desist, rejected the majority's constitutional argument, stating that "[w]here the spirit is
strong, there has heretofore been no impediment to producing only dictum through a 'case or
controversy.' Indeed that tradition started with Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137." 394
U.S. at 256 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Beytagh, supra note 8, at 1614-17; Currier, supra
note 20, at 216-18; Levy, supra note 13, at 15 n.48; Mallamud, supra note 26, at 331-35. But see
Note, Prospective Overmi/ng, supra note 13, at 930-36, 951 (endorsing nonretroactivity). Coin-
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It regarded the inequality of treatment as "an insignificant cost for ad-
herence to sound principles of decison-making. ' ' 40 The Court also noted
that prospective application of new standards might dim the incentive
of counsel to raise issues requiring a change in the law.4 ' DissentingJus-
tices42 and commentators, 43 however, remained troubled by the dispa-
rate treatment of similarly situated defendants and unconvinced by the
Court's justifications.
As its retroactivity doctrine evolved, the Court recognized two 44
categories of cases in which the Linkletter analysis was "simply not ap-
propriate. '45 To distinguish cases in the first category, the Court implic-
itly at first, and then explicitly,46 commenced its retroactivity analysis
mentators have advanced other explanations for the Court's preference for nonretroactivity.
See, e.g., Beytagh, supra note 8, at 1603-04 ("The Court is scarcely unaware of the criticisms
leveled against the non-retroactivity concept, and it appears unwilling to shed its last pretense
of acting in a traditional judicial fashion, a step that adoption of pure prospectivity would
require.").
40 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967).
41 Id Critics contend, however, that "the apparent discouraging effect may well be
overestimated" because first, there remains a chance that the rule will be applied retroac-
tively under the current doctrine and second, "institutional" litigants, such as the ACLU,
may be interested in establishing the rule for the benefit of future litigants even if the actual
defendant in the rule-changing case will not benefit. Mallamud, supra note 26, at 335-36; see
also Beytagh, supra note 8, at 1614 ("[T]he expressed concern about dulling the incentive of
counsel to challenge existing constitutional rules is not substantial enough to justify retaining
the otherwise unsound 'chance beneficiary' notion."). But see Mishkin, supra note 13, at 61
("[I]f parties anticipate such a prospective limitation, they will have no stimulus to argue for
change in the law.").
42 Justices Black and Douglas repeatedly condemned the unequal treatment of similarly
situated defendants caused by nonretroactivity. See, e.g., supra note 38. These Justices con-
tended that "a constitutional rule made retroactive in one case [the rule-making decision]
must be applied retroactively in all," even to cases on collateral attack. United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 543 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Johnson,
457 U.S. 537, 545 n.9 (1982).
43 Beytagh, supra note 8, at 1602-04, 1612-17; Currier, supra note 20, at 201-04; Haddad,
supra note 20, at 438; Torcia & King, supra note 26, at 289. See generally Comment, Partial
Retroactivity: A Question of Equal Protection, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 239 (1970).
44 Dissenting Justices, see, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 566 (1982)
(White, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 61 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting),
have suggested another category of cases in which retroactivity is determined by a single
threshold question: cases in which the major purpose of the new rule is "to overcome an
aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function." Williams v.
United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971) (plurality opinion).
In many cases the purpose inquiry was dispositive. see Williams, 401 U.S. at 653 n.6 (list
of cases), but it was not a threshold issue. Rather, it was part of the traditional Linblketter
balancing test, which is weighted toward retroactivity when the new rule ensures the reliabil-
ity of the verdict. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 548 n.1 1 (1982).
45 Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 508 (1973) (holding Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387
(1970), a double jeopardy case, fully retroactive).
46 Until the explicit recognition of a "clear break" threshold test in Desist v. United
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with a threshold inquiry: whether the rule sought to be applied in the
case was a "clear break with the past. '4 7 If the Court determined that a
rule did constitute a "clear break" with past decisions, it went on to
decide the retroactivity issue by balancing the Link/etler purpose, reli-
ance, and effect factors. 48 If the rule resulted from the Court's applica-
tion of settled principles in a new factual context, however, no
retroactivity issue existed because application of the preexisting princi-
ples and retroactive operation of the "new" rule would ideally yield the
same result. Therefore, when a decision did not overrule or significantly
change prior precedents,49 the Court accorded it retroactive operation
States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969), the Supreme Court implicitly required that the test be satisfied.
See, e.g., Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 619 n.1 ("Although Mapp may not be considered an overruling
decision. . . its effect certainly was to change existing law with regard to enforcement of the[search and seizure provisions of the fourth amendment]."). See generally United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 547 & n.5 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Desist decision illustrates the difficulty of ascertaining what constitutes a "clear
break with the past." In Desist, the Court held Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
applicable only to cases in which the surveillance made illegal in Katz was conducted after
the date of that decision. In Katz, the Court had overruled Goldman v. United States, 316
U.S. 129 (1942) and Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), in holding that elec-
tronic eavesdropping upon a private conversation is a search or seizure requiring a warrant.
The Desist Court recognized that the overruled decisions had been modified by the Court and
generally discredited but concluded that "however clearly our holding in Katz may have been
foreshadowed, it was a clear break with the past, and we are thus compelled to decide
whether its application should be limited to the future." Desist, 394 U.S. at 248. Justice
Fortas dissented, emphasizing that "the ruling at issue is neither novel nor unanticipated."
Id at 271 (Fortas, J., dissenting); see also id at 255 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Katz represented
"variatio[n] of old constitutional doctrine").
47 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969). The "clear break" test has been
phrased in a variety of ways. See infra note 49; see also Note, A La Recherche Du Temps Perdu:
Retroactivity and the Exclusionag Rule, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 84, 86 n.7 (1979).
48 See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
49 In general, the Court has not subsequently read a decision to work a 'sharp
break in the web of the law,' Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 381, n.2
(1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) unless that ruling caused 'such an abrupt and
fundamental shift in doctrine as to constitute an entirely new rule which in
effect replaced an older one,' Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
392 U.S. 481, 498 (1968). Such a break has been recognized only when a
decision explicitly overrules a past precedent of this Court, see, e.g., Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646
(1971), or disapproves a practice this Court arguably has sanctioned in prior
cases, see, e.g., Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S., at 673 (plurality opinion); Adams v.
Illinois, 405 U.S., at 283;Johnson v. NewJersey, 384 U.S., at 731, or overturns a
longstanding and widespread practice to which this Court has not spoken, but
which a near-unanimous body of lower court authority has expressly ap-
proved. See, e.g., Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S., at 673 (plurality opinion) (apply-
ing nonretroactively a decision that "effected a decisional change in attitude
that had prevailed for many decades"); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S., at 299-300.
See also Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107 (1971); Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Milton v. Wainwrght, 407 U.S., at 381-382, n.2
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without recourse to the Libike//er analysis. 50
The second category of cases, in which the Linkietter test was simi-
larly inapplicable, involved rulings that a trial court lacked the author-
ity to convict or punish a criminal defendant. 5' The Court auto-
matically applied these cases retroactively based on the idea that the
prior convictions were void ab initio because the trial court "lacked ju-
risdiction in the traditional sense." 52
C. Justice Harlan's Critique of Traditional Analysis and His
Proposed Standard
Justice Harlan was a consistent critic53 of the Linkletter formulation.
He focused his attack on the Court's asserted power to deny retroactive
application of new constitutional rules to cases before it on direct re-
view. 54 Harlan contended that such a denial constituted a departure
(Stewart, J., dissenting) ("sharp break" occurs when "decision overrules clear
past precedent ...or disrupts a practice long accepted and widely relied
upon").
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1982).
50 See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 206 (1979) (explaining application of
rule in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975)); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 412
(1969) (further explicating principles of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)); see also United
States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549 (1982); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 544 (1975)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
51 The Court has invalidated inconsistent prior judgments where its reading of a
particular constitutional guarantee immunizes a defendant's conduct from
punishment, see, e.g., United States v. United States Coin & Curreny, 401 U.S. 715,
724 (1971) . . .or serves "to prevent [his] trial from taking place at all, rather
than to prescribe procedural rules that govern the conduct of [that] trial."
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 550 (1982) (quoting Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505,
509 (1973)); see, e.g., Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 693 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(protesting Court's decision to apply nonretroactively O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258
(1969) (servicemen charged with crimes that are not "service connected" entitled to grand
jury indictment and trial by jury in civilian court)); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972)
(retroactive application of eighth amendment ruling of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972)); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 437 n.1 (1970) (retroactive application of double
jeopardy rule of Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)).
52 Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 61 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
53 Harlan did join in some of the earlier nonretroactivity opinions because he "thought
it important to limit the impact of constitutional decisions which seemed to [him] profoundly
unsound in principle." Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing). In Desist, Justice Harlan broke with the Court, stating, "I can no longer. . . remain
content with the doctrinal confusion that has characterized our efforts to apply the basic
Linketter principle. 'Retroactivity' must be rethought." Id
54 Justice Harlan stated in Desist.: "I have concluded that Linkletter was right in insisting
that all 'new' rules of constitutional law must, at a minimum, be applied to all those cases
which are still subject to'direct review by this Court at the time the 'new' decision is handed
down." Id at 258.
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from the traditional principles underlying judicial review and an imper-
missible incursion into the legislator's domain.55 He argued that the
Court must weigh the purpose and scope of a proposed rule in arriving
at a decision in the first instance. Once the Court renders its decision,
however, it must apply the new rule retroactively to all cases on direct
review because a proper perception of the Court's duties as "a court of
law, charged with applying the Constitution to resolve every legal dis-
pute within [its] jurisdiction on direct review mandates that [the Court]
apply the law as it is at the time, not as it once was."'56
Harlan also catalogued a number of unacceptable consequences of
the Court's nonretroactivity doctrine. First, he contended that the non-
retroactive application of new rules violated the constitutional require-
ment that similarly situated defendants receive equal protection under
the law.57 Although prospective application of new rules might alleviate
this defect, Harlan argued that anything short of retroactive application
to nonfinal convictions might deter litigants from challenging estab-
lished precedent. Faced with the possibility that the Court might not
extend the protection of a new constitutional interpretation to the liti-
gant who successfully asserts it, a litigant has little incentive to present
new constitutional claims.58
Justice Harlan expressed even greater concern that the nonretroac-
tive and prospective application of new rules would lead to excessive
judicial activism. Nonretroactivity allows the Court to revise constitu-
tional rules of criminal procedure free of the practical repercussions that
such a revision would entail if the rule were to apply to all defendants.
It "tends to cut the Court loose from the force of precedent, allowing
[the Court] to restructure artificially those expectations legitimately cre-
ated by extant law and thereby mitigate the practical force of stare
55 See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675-81 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258-59 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
56 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 681 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
Note, Prospective Overruling, supra note 13, at 912 (courts should dispose of cases on basis of
existing law, regardless of precedent and conceptually should not enforce that which is no
longer law).
57 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Simply
fishing one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new
constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of similar cases subsequently to flow
by unaffected by that new rule constitutes an indefensible departure from [the] model of
judicial review.").
58 This argument is more persuasive in the context of pure prospectivity when even the
defendant in the rule-changing case is denied the benefit of the rule he precipitated. How-
ever, the concern is still valid in a nonretroactivity context because very few cases are ac-
cepted for Supreme Court review and a litigant's chances of participating in a rule-changing
case are slight. See, e.g., supra note 38 (4 out of 80 possible appellants benefitted from Miranda
decision). A litigant may choose not to commit her resources to an appeal because even if the
court accepts her theory, the rule may not apply retroactively to her if hers is not chosen to be
the precedent-changing case. But see supra note 41 (minimizing this concern).
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decisis." 59
At the same time, Harlan argued that the nonretroactivity doctrine
had the opposite effect on lower courts, reducing them "largely to the
role of automatons. ' 60 Harlan contended that the doctrine distorted the
process of constitutional adjudication in the lower courts by encourag-
ing decisional obedience instead of the development of new constitu-
tional principles from past cases. A court had no incentive to develop
the law because if it correctly foresaw a new constitutional rule, the
Supreme Court might still reverse the holding on the ground that the
Court's new rule did not operate retroactively.
In addition to his objections to the principle of nonretroactivity and
its consequences, Justice Harlan criticized the Court's inconsistent appli-
cation of the Linkletter test. He pointed out that individual Justices used
nonretroactivity for different purposes, some to limit new rules that they
considered wrongly decided, 61 some to facilitate broad reforms.6 2 These
differing approaches resulted in a body of retroactivity case law that was
virtually impossible to reconcile with the Court's stated criteria.6 3
In response to these problems, Harlan proposed a different rule that
focused on the adjudicatory process by which the litigant sought review
of his constitutional claim, rather than on a legislative inquiry into pur-
pose, reliance, and effect. Harlan asserted that the principles of judicial
59 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 680 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted); see also Beytagh, supra note 8, at 1562-63 ("Linkletter and its progeny may... have
their greatest significance in freeing a reform-minded Court from any apprehension about the
past."); Haddad, supra note 20, at 439 ("[T]he prospective-only technique. . . . is designed to
increase a court's freedom of action. . . . The alternative to the prospective-only technique is
a more conservative approach to constitutional criminal procedure.").
Some Justices regarded this freedom to make law as one of the chief assets of the theory.
See Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 218 (1969) (ChiefJustice Warren recognized inequities
of nonretroactivity but explained that "[t]he resulting incongruities must be balanced against
the impetus the technique provides for the implementation of long overdue reforms, which
otherwise could not be practicably effected"); see also Currier, supra note 20, at 212; Levy,
supra note 13, at 26; Mallamud, supra note 26, at 329-30, 339-40.
60 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 680 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see Desist
v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 259 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); id at 277 (Fortas, J.,
dissenting); see also Beytagh, supra note 8, at 1617-19; Hasler, supra note 8, at 23-27.
Professor Hasler argues that lower courts may refuse to consider the litigant's constitu-
tional claim because "even if [the court] were to conclude that the reasoning of the litigant is
correct and that the logical extension of constitutional principles compels a certain conclu-
sion, the litigant could not benefit from such a ruling because of the nonretroactivity of the
decisions employed, and that therefore any such consideration is moot." Hasler, supra note 8,
at 27.
61 See Beytagh, supra note 8, at 1563-64. Initially, Justice Harlan belonged in this camp.
See supra note 53.
62 See supra note 59.
63 See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The
upshot of this confluence of viewpoints was that the subsequent course of Linkletter became
almost as difficult to follow as the tracks made by a beast of prey in search of its intended
victim."); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256-57 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
supra notes 24, 30-31.
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review required courts to apply all rules64 of constitutional law to all
convictions not yet final at the time of the decision. 65 Harlan conceded,
however, that "the choice of law problem as it applies to cases [heard]
on habeas seems . . . a more difficult one."'66
In determining that courts should apply the law existing at the time
of original trial to litigants seeking to nullify convictions on habeas,
Harlan again focused on the "nature, function and scope of the adjudi-
catory process."'6 7 Harlan explained that although "the entire theoreti-
cal underpinnings of judicial review and constitutional supremacy ' 68
compel federal courts to adjudicate every issue of law on direct review,
the courts have never had the same obligation on habeas.69 In his
estimation, habeas review was not intended to be a substitute for direct
review; Harlan viewed it as a collateral remedy the scope of which could
be circumscribed by society's interest in the finality of criminal
convictions. 70
Noting his disagreement with the Court's expansion of the habeas
writ but feeling bound by it, Harlan isolated two general purposes of
habeas review. 7 1 First, habeas "lies to inquire into every constitutional
64 Because Harlan would apply all constitutional rulings to claims before the court on
direct review, he addresses the "new" rule or "clear break" inquiry only in dealing with cases
on collateral attack. Harlan distinguished cases in which the Court has "simply applied a
well-established constitutional principle to govern a case which is closely analogous to those
which have been previously considered," from cases which enunciated "new" rules of consti-
tutional law. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Harlan would apply cases in the former category retroactively, even to cases on collateral
attack, because "one could never say with any assurance that [the] Court would have ruled
differently at the time the petitioner's conviction became final." Id at 264. However, where
the Court announces a "new" rule, the habeas prisoner would be entitled only to the law
prevailing at the time of his conviction. Id at 263. Harlan also recognizes the difficulty of
determining whether a decision constitutes a "clear break." Id at 263-65.
65 See supra note 54.
66 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan
recognized that the retroactivity problem arose because the extent of inquiry into alleged
constitutional errors was drastically expanded by decisions such as Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963) (holding for first time that in certain circumstances, habeas corpus petitioner could
collaterally attack his conviction even though "new" constitutional rule upon which he based
his attack was not suggested in original proceedings) and Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S.
217 (1969) (specifically holding that fourth amendment claim of unconstitutional search and
seizure, although not made at trial or assigned as error on appeal, is cognizable in federal
habeas corpus petition). But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.37 (1975) (decided after
Harlan's dissents in M4acke
, 
and Desist; holding that "a federal court need not apply the exclu-
sionary rule on habeas review of the fourth amendment claim absent a showing that the state
prisoner was denied an opportunity for a full and fair litigation of that claim at trial and on
direct review"). He therefore analyzed the "retroactivity" issue as "none other than a prob-
lem as to the scope of the habeas writ," to be resolved by reference to the purpose of the writ.
see Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 684 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
67 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682 (1971) (Harlan J., dissenting).
68 Id
69 Id
70 Id at 682-83.
7' Id at 685.
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defect in any criminal trial, where the petitioner remains 'in custody'
because of the judgment in that trial. ' 72 Second, habeas provides a
quasi-appellate review function that forces state and federal courts to
"toe the constitutional mark. ' 73 Harlan asserted that neither of these
purposes require retroactive application of new rules on habeas. He
claimed that the Constitution does not mandate that courts apply ex-
isting law74 in determining whether an individual is "in custody in vio-
lation of the constitution. '75  Additionally, although courts have
assumed that they should apply current constitutional law to habeas
petitioners' claims, Harlan thought it unwise and unnecessary to do so
to further the enforcement purpose of the expanded writ. 76
Finally, in weighing the individual and state interests implicated by
the scope of the writ and the choice of law problem, Harlan regarded
society's interest in finality in the criminal process as paramount.77
72 Id (citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) and Kaufman v. United States, 394
U.S. 217 (1969)).
73 Mack, 401 U.S. at 687 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
74 id at 686-87.
75 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
76 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 687 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
77 For a criminal system to work, "[n]o one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial
system, not society as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing a man shall tentatively go
to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be
subject to fresh litigation on issues already resolved." Id at 691.
Justice Powell, in his concurrence in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259-66
(1972) (Powell, J., concurring), also emphasized the societal costs of habeas. Among the socie-
tal interests that he contended would be adversely affected by an expansive writ were: "(i)
the most effective utilization of limited judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in crimi-
nal trials, (iii) the minimization of friction between our federal and state systems of justice,
and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional balance upon which the doctrine of federalism
is founded." Id at 259.
Additionally, one commentator contended that broad availability of the writ under-
mines a sense of "repose [that] is a psychological necessity in a secure and active society." See
Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV.
441, 446 (1963). Others point out that prisoners themselves suffer from the lack of finality
because of the detrimental impact it has on rehabilitation efforts. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Search,
Seizure and Section 2255, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 373-384 (1964). See general' Mishkin, supra
note 13, at 77 n.71 (weighs finality interest as Harlan and Powell do).
Many critics have found these views unconvincing. First, they contend that convenient
administration ofjustice cannot outweigh a litigant's interest in vindicating his constitutional
rights. See supra note 26. One commentator also asserted that
[slober reflection upon why we have devised a system which allows a contin-
ued questioning of its processes discloses that our purpose is not so much to
remove the discomforting doubt or to achieve the ultimate reassurance, as it is
to give safeguard to rights not readily visible or easily acknowledged ...
[W]ith knowledge of our fallibility and a realization of past errors, we can
hardly insure our confidence by creating an irrevocable end to the guilt-deter-
mining process.
Lay, Modem Administrative Proposalhfor Federal Habeas, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 701, 709-10 (1972).
Seegenerally Schwartz, supra note 25, at 742-47 (also finding finality argument unpersuasive).
Some commentators reject the idea that a lack of finality may have an adverse effect on
prisoner rehabilitation, asserting instead that "the availability of collateral relief is a very
1983] RETROACTIVITY
Harlan contended, therefore, that subject to a few exceptions, 78 a habeas
petitioner should not receive the retroactive benefit of new constitu-
tional protections. 79
Although Justice Harlan's approach has its critics,80 the Court rec-
ognized the force of his critique and seemingly applied the Harlan anal-
ysis in United States v. Johnson. 81
wholesome kind of therapy." Freund, Symposium on Habeas Corpus, 9 UTAH L. REV. 18, 30
(1964); cf. Schwartz, supra note 25, at 744 (too little is known about rehabilitation to enable
one to judge effects of expansive reading of habeas relief.
Finally, critics assert that the real source of state resentment against federal intrusions is
the Supreme Court's expansion of prisoners' rights, not an expanded remedy for violations of
those rights. See Chisum, In Defense of Modern Federal Habeas Corpus for State Pisoners, 21 DE
PAUL L. REv. 682, 693 (1972).
78 Justice Harlan would permit two exceptions to the nonretroactivity of new rules in
habeas proceedings: (1) where the new rules are ones of substantive due process putting cer-
tain conduct beyond the government's authority to punish (as in Street v. New York, 394 U.S.
576 (1969), Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965)); and (2) where the Court finds new procedural rules that are "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" under Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (as in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel at trial)). See Mack, 401 U.S. at 693
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan considered an additional exception in the form of an inquiry, akin to the
Linkletter purpose analysis, into whether the rule is designed to improve the reliabilty of the
verdict, but rejected the idea. He found "inherently intractable the purported distinction
between those new rules that are designed to improve the fact finding process and those
designed to further other values." Mackq, 401 U.S. at 695 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice
Harlan cites in support of this contention the difficulty the Mackey plurality had in explaining
DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (per curiam), Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967), and Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). See supra note 24. But see Williams v.
United States, 401 U.S. 646, 655 n.7 (1971) (plurality opinion); id at 665 (Marshall, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that determining whether procedure is "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty" is more difficult than applying Linkletter test).
79 MackVy, 401 U.S. at 688 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
80 Critics of the Harlan approach assert that "[tihere is no magic dividing line between
cases on direct review and those under collateral attack." Beytagh, supra note 8, at 1601. The
function and actual operation of the two procedures are virtually indistinguishable and, in
many cases, there is no significant difference with respect to the age or difficulty of retrying
cases on direct appeal as opposed to those on collateral attack. See Schwartz, supra note 25, at
731.
Although critics concede that the Harlan approach would alleviate some of the "patent
arbitrariness of nonretroactivity," Beytagh, supra note 8, at 160 1, they contend that the great-
est evil of nonretroactivity, treating similarly situated defendants differently, remains. See
Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 657 n.9 (1971) (plurality opinion) (Justice White
illustrates inequalities that would remain); Beytagh, supra note 8, at 1601; Schaefer, The Con-
trol of "Sunbursts':" Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 631, 645 (1967):
[W]hen a court is itself changing the law by an overruling decision, its deter-
mination of prospectivity or retroactivity should not depend upon the stage in
the judicial process that a particular case has reached when the change is
made. Too many irrelevant considerations, including the common cold, bear
upon the rate of progress of a case through the judicial system.
Schwartz, supra note 25, at 732.
81 See infra notes 99-118 and accompanying text.
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II
RETROACTIVITY IN FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY
RULE CASES: A REVERSAL IN DOCTRINE
A. United States v. Peltier. Presumptive Nonretroactivity in Fourth
Amendment Cases
Although the Supreme Court had stressed in the cases following
Lizkletter that "the retroactivity or non-retroactivity of a rule is not au-
tomatically determined by the provision of the Constitution on which
the dictate is based,"' 82 it consistently found fourth amendment cases
dealing with the exclusionary rule nonretroactive.8 3 These decisions
turned on a determination that retroactive application of new rules did
not serve the primary purpose8 4 of the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule, deterrence of illegal police action.85
The Court recognized fourth amendment cases as a distinct area of
retroactivity law in United States V. Peltier. 86 In Peltier, the Court held
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,87 which invalidated warrantless, roving
automobile searches by border patrol agents acting without probable
cause, not applicable to searches conducted prior to the date of the ,4-
meida-Sanchez decision. The Peltier Court departed from traditional
82 Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728 (1966); see United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S.
531, 550 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 410 (1966).
83 It is indisputable, however, that in every case in which the Court has ad-
dressed the retroactivity problem in the context of the exclusionary rule,
whereby concededly relevant evidence is excluded in order to enforce a consti-
tutional guarantee that does not relate to the integrity of the factfinding pro-
cess, the Court has concluded that any such new constitutional principle
would be accorded only prospective application.
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 535 (1975) (citing Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797
(1971); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971); Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213
(1969); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968);
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); Linkletter
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)).
84 The Peltier Court also discussed the "imperative ofjudicial integrity" rationale for the
exclusionary rule. See 422 U.S. at 536. The Court had previously ignored this rationale in
applying the Link/etter purpose test in fourth amendment cases. As Justice Brennan explained
it, the exclusionary rule "enabl[es] the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official
lawlessness and assur[es] the people that the government would not profit from its lawless
behavior." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974). Justice Brennan, in his
dissent in Peltier, welcomed the reintroduction of this "core value" but noted that "the Court
merges the 'imperative of judicial integrity' into its deterrence rationale, . . . and then ig-
nores the imperative when it applies its new theory to the facts of this case." 422 U.S. at 554
n. 13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85 See Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971) (plurality opinion) (because
exclusionary rule in fourth amendment cases does not "proscribe the use of certain evidence
.. .to minimize or to avoid arbitrary or unreliable results" and thereby "raises no question
about the guilt of defendants convicted in prior trials," Linkleltter reliance and effect factors
compel nonretroactivity); see also supra note 83 and accompanying text.
86 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
87 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
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analysis by concentrating exclusively on the purpose of the new ruling88
and abandoning the "clear break" threshold inquiry in reaching its deci-
sion.8 9 By altering the Linkletter test in this way, the Court in Peltier
made explicit the Court's presumption of nonretroactivity in fourth
amendment cases.90
In Peltier, the Court concluded that retroactive application of a
fourth amendment ruling does not serve either of the twin justifications
for the exclusionary rule-"the imperative of judicial integrity" 9' or the
deterrence of illegal police conduct-if law enforcement officers reason-
ably believed in good faith that the evidence they seized would be ad-
88 Whether or not the exclusionary rule should be applied to the roving Border
Patrol search conducted in this case, then, depends on whether considerations
of either judicial integrity or deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations are
sufficiently weighty to require that the evidence obtained by the Border Pa-
trol in this case be excluded.
Peltier, 422 U.S. at 539; see also Note, supra note 47, at 97-99.
89 The Peltier opinion contains no reference to the "clear break" threshold test, but its
repudiation of this test is implicit in its treatment of the lower court's opinion. The majority
in the court of appeals held that because Almeida-Sanchez merely "reaffirmed well-established
Fourth Amendment standards" that did not "disturb a long-accepted and relied upon prac-
tice," Peltier v. United States, 500 F.2d 985, 988 (9th Cir. 1974), Peltier was entitled to the
benefit of the decision, "not because of retroactivity but because of Fourth Amendment prin-
ciples never deviated from by the Supreme Court." Id at 989. The Ninth Circuit dissent in
Peltier concluded that Almeida-Sanchez overruled a consistent line of courts of appeals prece-
dent. Because the decision stated a "new" rule, the dissenters applied the Linklelter factors
and found that the case should operate nonretroactively. Peltier, 500 F.2d at 991 (Wallace, J.
dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Peltier, outlined the traditional rule that the
majority and dissent on the Ninth Circuit had used in reaching their differing positions. The
Court, however, did not endorse the analysis of the lower court dissent in reversing the Ninth
Circuit's determination. Instead, it avoided discussion of the threshold question, the source of
the split below, and emphasized that "the policies underlying the [exclusionary] rule do not
justify its retrospective application." United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 534-35 (1975).
Courts and commentators have read the Court's opinion as an abandonment of the "clear
break" threshold test. See, e.g., Peltier, 422 U.S. at 544-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting); United
States v. Escalante, 554 F.2d 970 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 862 (1977); Note,
supra note 47, at 86, 87 n.9. But cf. United States v. Blake, 632 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1980)
(employing "clear break" test and traditional Linkletter analysis in determining that its deci-
sion in United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1978), announcing same rule
Supreme Court later set out in Pqyton, applied retroactively).
90 See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 564 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) ("[N]ew
extensions of the exclusionary rule do not serve [to overcome a flaw in the truth determining
process] and, therefore, will not generally be applied retroactively."); United States v. Peltier,
422 U.S. 531, 550 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court substitutes at least as re-
spects cases involving searches invalid under the Fourth Amendment, a presumption against
the availability of decisions of this Court except prospectively."); United States v. Ross, 655
F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("In [Peltier], the Supreme Court reiterated that decisions
expanding the scope of the exclusionary rule should have prospective effect only."); Note,
supra note 47, at 87, 102-05 (Court "created a general presumption against retroactive appli-
cability" of cases involving searches invalid under fourth amendment); see also in/a notes 93-
98 and accompanying text (asserting that by formulating test in which illegally seized evi-
dence should be suppressed only if knowledge of new standard can be imputed to law enforce-
ment officer, Court begins with presumption of nonretroactivity).
91 See supra note 84.
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missible at trial.92 Thus, the Peltier Court refused to apply new fourth
amendment decisions retroactively to suppress the fruits of searches
made illegal by those decisions unless the law enforcement officer "had
knowledge or [could] properly be charged with knowledge, that the
search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment." 93
Under the Peltier rule, the novelty of the fourth amendment ruling,
formerly the focus of the threshold "clear break" test, became a part of
the inquiry into the police officer's knowledge or blameworthiness. The
Court held that the Almeida-Sanchez ruling was unanticipated and thus,
the officer in Peltier could not have known that his actions were uncon-
stitutional; without such knowledge, retroactive application of Almeida-
Sanchez would not advance the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary
rule.94 The consequence of this departure from traditional analysis was
a dilution of the "clear break" test, resulting in a presumption of nonret-
roactivity in fourth amendment cases. For example, if the Court had
raised but reserved, or never explicitly resolved, a constitutional ques-
tion, a police officer could not be expected to perform a court's function
by applying settled principles in new and immediate factual situations.
92 422 U.S. at 537.
93 Id at 542. The Pcltier Court does not make clear whose knowledge is determinative,
that of the officer who conducted the illegal search or that of the law enforcement establish-
ment. The Court also left vague the quantum of knowledge sufficient to trigger retroactivity.
See Note, supra note 47, at 99; see also Peltier, 422 U.S. at 553 n. 12, 554, 558-59 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). However, the Peltier Court's reference to "the law enforcement officer," 422 U.S.
at 542, and its emphasis on excluding evidence only when blameworthy conduct by the police
is involved, 422 U.S. at 537-39, 542, yield the conclusion that the Court intended the individ-
ual officer's knowledge to be the target of the Pltier test. See Note, supra note 47, at 102. By
focusing on the individual officer's knowledge, the Court also answered the question of what
quantum of knowledge is sufficient to produce retroactive application: "[G]iven their greater
legal sophistication, law enforcement institutions can reasonably be held accountable to a
much higher standard of constructive knowledge than could an officer in the field. Police
officers could probably be held accountable for only deliberate or negligent disregard of ex-
plicit, preexisting guidelines." Note, supra note 47, at 99.
The Court's conclusion is consistent with a theory of specific deterrence in which the
officers involved learn through the sanction of exclusion. Brennan objects to the belief that
the exclusionary rule is designed to punish an individual officer so that he will not repeat his
mistake. He asserts that "the exclusionary rule, focused upon general, not specific, deterrence,
depends not upon threatening a sanction for lack of compliance but upon removing an under-
lying inducement to violate Fourth Amendment rights." Peltier, 422 U.S. at 557 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see a/so Note, supra note 47, at 105-09.
The distinction between specific and general deterrence is significant because in the ab-
sence of departmental sanctions, exclusion of evidence does not injure the individual police-
man and thus is not an effective deterrent. If, however, the retroactivity of a rule is predicated
upon the knowledge of those who have the greatest stake in convictions-the police and judi-
cial establishment-the exclusion sanction may provide a meaningful incentive to be more
sensitive to constitutional standards.
94 In Pltier, the majority concluded that "[]t was in reliance upon a validly enacted
statute, supported by longstanding administrative regulations and continuous judicial ap-
proval, that Border Patrol agents stopped and searched respondent's automobile. . . . [W]e
cannot regard as blameworthy those parties who conform their conduct to the prevailing
statutory or constitutional norm." 422 U.S. at 541-42. But see supra note 89; infra note 96.
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A court could not reasonably charge law enforcement officials with an-
ticipating many constitutional rules that the court, endowed with
greater legal sophistication, would have held to be mere extensions of
settled principles.95 Thus, under Peltier's knowledge rule, a new stan-
dard could be applied retroactively only if the issue were one that the
Court had previously addressed-a situation presenting no retroactivity
question under traditional analysis.
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Peltier, asserted that Almeida-Sanchez
merely reaffirmed traditional fourth amendment principles and there-
fore warranted retroactive operation.96 The dissent further objected to
the majority's silent repudiation of the "clear break" test. Brennan ar-
gued that the "tolerable anomaly" of inequity among defendants when
a new rule is applied nonretroactively becomes "intolerable, and a trav-
esty of justice" when the Court denies similarly situated defendants the
benefit of long-established constitutional principles.97 Additionally, the
dissent protested that when the Court denies retroactive application of a
decision that is not a "clear break" with precedent, it encourages law
enforcement officials to honor only those standards that the Court has
set forth precisely. After Peltier, police officials could safely disregard
inconvenient precedent until the Court specifically decided that settled
principles were applicable in a particular factual situation.98
95 See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 560 (1982); in/ra note 116. For an exam-
ple of how little the Court expects police officers to anticipate new law, see Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 (1979):
Police are charged to enforce laws until and unless they are declared unconsti-
tutional. The enactment of a law forecloses speculation by enforcement of-
ficers concerning its constitutionality-with the possible exception of a law so
grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable pru-
dence would be bound to see its flaws.
96 United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 544-47 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Bren-
nan noted that
both the Court's opinion and the concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE POW-
ELL in Almeida-Sanchez plainly applied familiar principles of constitutional ad-
judication announced 50 years ago in Carroll o. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
153-154 (1925), and merely construed 66 Stat. 233, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3), so
as to render it constitutionally consistent with that decision.
Id at 544. Furthermore, the dissent asserted "approval by Courts of Appeals of this law
enforcement practice was short-lived, less than unanimous, irreconcilable with other rulings
of the same courts, and contrary to the explicit doctrine of this Court in Carroll. " Id at 547
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Ninth Circuit in Peltier v. United States, 500 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1974), came to the
same conclusion. See supra note 89.
97 Peltier, 422 U.S. at 548-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98 Id at 549. As Justice Fortas explained in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 277
(1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting):
To decide on nonretroactivity without a "clear break" test add[s] this Court's
approval to those who honor the Constitution's mandate only where accepta-
ble to them or compelled by the precise and inescapable specifics of a decision
of this Court. And they award dunce caps to those law enforcement officers,
courts, and public officials who do not merely stand by until an inevitable
decree issues from this Court, specifically articulating that which is clearly
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B. United States v. Johnson.: The Court Discards the Peltier Analysis
in Fourth Amendment Cases-But What Remains?
In United States v. Johnson,99 the Supreme Court reconsidered the
standard applicable to retroactivity questions in fourth amendment
cases and adopted a significantly different approach than that pre-
scribed in Peltier. The Johnson Court adopted, in part, Justice Harlan's
approach in applying Payton v. New York 10o retroactively to Johnson's
nonfinal conviction. Payton prohibits police from making a warrantless
immanent in the fulfillment of the Constitution, but who generously apply
the mandates of the Constitution as the developing case law elucidates them.
Justice Brennan also criticized the Peltier formulation because it "could stop dead in its
tracks judicial development of Fourth Amendment rights." 422 U.S. at 554 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). He asserted that courts will automatically deny an accused's motion to suppress
evidence that the accused claims was unconstitutionally seized unless the accused can cite a
case invalidating a search or seizure on identical facts. Thus the rule's value in "forcing
judges to enlighten our understanding of Fourth Amendment guarantees," by reviewing al-
leged violations, is lost. Id at 555. Additionally, on a practical level, the Peltier inquiry into
an officer's subjective knowledge will introduce another layer of fact finding into an already
overburdened judicial system. Id at 560. But see id at 543 n.1 3 ("Whether today's decision
will reduce the responsibilities of district courts, as the dissent first suggests, or whether that
burden will be increased, as the dissent also suggests, it surely will not fulfill both of these
contradictory prophecies.") (emphasis in original)
Finally, Justice Brennan contended that the Court's treatment of the exclusionary rule in
fourth amendment cases as a specific deterrent designed to punish individual officers presages
the demise of the exclusionary rule. The dissent believed that the new Peltier "knowledge"
inquiry, with its focus on the good faith of the individual officer, would not "be confined to
putative retroactivity cases. Rather, [they] suspec[ed] that when a suitable opportunity
arises, [the] revision of the exclusionary rule [requiring the courts to probe the subjective
knowledge of the officer who orders the search or seizure] will be pronounced applicable to all
search-and-seizure cases." Id at 552 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
On May 5, 1977, two secret service agents, suspecting respondent Raymond Eugene
Johnson of attempting to negotiate a misdelivered United States Treasury check, entered
Johnson's home without a warrant and without his consent. After advising him of his rights,
the agents interrogated Johnson and, when he admitted his participation in the scheme, the
agents formally arrested him.
Before trial, Johnson sought to suppress his statements as fruits of an unlawful arrest not
supported by probable cause. The district court found the arrest proper and admitted the
evidence. The jury convicted Johnson of aiding and abetting obstruction of correspondence
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1702 (1982). In an unreported decision filed on December 19,
1978, the court of appeals affirmed Johnson's conviction. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 539-40.
On April 15, 1980, while Johnson's petition for rehearing was pending before the Ninth
Circuit, the Supreme Court held in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), that the fourth
amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a
suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest. The Payton decision settled an "im-
portant constitutional question" that the Court had "expressly left open in a number of...
prior opinions." Johnson, 457 U.S. at 55 1. The Court, in deciding to invalidate the New York
statutes authorizing this practice, noted that although the appellate courts and state courts
had reached mixed results on the question, the judicial trend had been toward the Payton
view. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 553 n.15.
On September 2, 1980, the Ninth Circuit granted respondent Johnson's petition for re-
hearing, withdrew its prior opinion, and on the strength of Payton, reversed the conviction.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the reversal of Johnson's conviction.
100 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
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nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine
felony arrest.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court in Johnson, neither relied
on, nor expressly rejected, Peltier in finding Payton retroactive, even
though the Peltier analysis clearly would have required a nonretroactive
result.' 0 ' The Court instead focused on the rule that emerged from Link-
letter, "that all newly declared constitutional rules of criminal procedure
would apply retrospectively at least to judgments of conviction not yet
final when the [new] rule was established."10 2 The Johnson opinion
noted that in post-Link/etter cases, the Court had departed from this "ba-
sic principle,"10 3 but documented a "stream" of separate opinions con-
sistent with the original formulation. 10 4 The Court detailed approvingly
Justice Harlan's arguments in favor of this retroactivity standard 05 and
concluded that, subject to certain exceptions, a decision construing the
fourth amendment is applicable to all convictions not final at the time
that decision was rendered.10 6
The Court qualified its adoption of Harlan's approach by recogniz-
ing the continued vitality of certain categories of precedent. TheJohnson
Court defined three narrow categories of cases in which the Court pur-
portedly 10 7 had resolved the choice of law question by application of a
threshold determination rather than the Linkletter test.108
The Court first identified the category of cases determined by "ju-
risdictional" threshold inquiries. In these cases, the Court always had
"recognized full retroactivity as a necessary adjunct to a ruling that a
trial court lacked authority to convict or punish a criminal defendant in
101 See supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
102 Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 543 (1982).
103 Id at 543.
104 Id at 545.
105 Id at 546-48.
The Court stated that in Harlan's view, failure to apply new constitutional rulings to
cases pending on direct appeal at the time of the decision violated three norms of constitu-
tional adjudication: (1) The Court's "ambulatory retroactivity doctrine" conflicted with the
norm of principled decisionmaking. Id at 546; see supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text;
see also supra note 30 (discussing Court's inconsistent application of Linkletter criteria). (2) The
Court, in prescribing nonretroactive applications for new rules, is improperly performing a
legislative function. 457 U.S. at 546-47; see supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. (3) The
Court's nonretroactivity doctrine inevitably results in unequal treatment of similarly situated
defendants. 457 U.S. at 547-48; see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
106 457 U.S. at 562.
107 TheJohnson Court stated that these cases "have not proved 'readily susceptible of
analysis under the Linketter line of cases.'" 457 U.S. at 548 n. 11 (quoting Robinson v. Neil,
409 U.S. 505, 508 (1973)). It rejected the dissent's argument that the three categories exclude
the "most obvious" line of cases, those relating to the integrity of the verdict, because those
cases turned on the Link/etter purpose factor. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 548. The Johnson majority
failed to account, however, for its own use of a "clear break" category of cases whose nonret-
roactivity it specifically ascribes to the weight of two Linkletter factors, reliance and effect. See
infia text accompanying note 114.
108 Id at 547 n.10, 548 n. 1.
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the first place."10 9
Justice Blackmun developed the other two categories of precedent
and a residuary class of cases not controlled by prior retroactivity cases
through an imaginative reading of the "clear break" threshold test.
Beforejohnson, the "clear break" test separated those cases that, as prod-
ucts of settled principles, did not pose a retroactivity problem from cases
that, as vehicles for new principles of constitutional law, warranted
analysis under the Linkletter test to determine retroactivity. The Johnson
Court distinguished three classes of cases using the same test: (1) deci-
sions that were extensions of settled principles; 110 (2) decisions in which
the Court had "expressly declared a rule of criminal procedure to be 'a
clear break with the past' -;111 and (3) decisions like Pa/on that fall
within neither of the other "narrow" categories and thus are not con-
trolled by existing precedent. 1 2
The Court's restatement of the "clear break" test significantly
changed the test's content and effect. According to the traditional analy-
sis, either a rule was a "clear break with the past" or it was not-no
middle ground existed. TheJohnson Court, by narrowly redefining prior
cases, created a third, residual class of cases. Because Paton fit within
neither the "clear break" nor the "settled precedent" categories of ex-
isting precedent, the logic of the Harlan approach controlled and dic-
tated retroactivity. Thus, the restated "clear break" test allowed the
Court to justify its result without overruling seemingly irreconcilable
precedents. It simply dismissed the government's contention that Peltier
was controlling precedent in fourth amendment cases by classing Peltier
as one of the "clear break" cases.' 13
109 Id at 550; see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
110 Johnson, 457 U.S. at 549.
111 Id at 549-50.
112 Id The Court found that Payton fit within none of the categories of controlling prece-
dent. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 551. Because the Payton question had been expressly left open in
prior decisions, the rule was not a settled one. Nor did Payton hold that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction "in the traditional sense." Johnson, 457 U.S. at 554. Finally, Payton was not a
"clear break" with past precedents; it did not disapprove a practice the Court had arguably
sanctioned in previous cases, nor overturn a long-standing and widespread practice that the
Court had not addressed, but which a near unanimous body of lower courts had expressly
approved. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 552-54.
113 Johnson, 457 U.S. at 558. The Court stated:
Because Almaida-Sanchez .. .represented a "clear break with the past,".
under controlling retroactivity precedents, the nonretroactive application of
Almeida-Sanchez would have been appropriate even if the case had involved no
Fourth Amendment question. In that respect, Peltier resembles several earlier
decisions that held "new" Fourth Amendment doctrine nonretroactive, not
on the ground that all Fourth Amendment rulings apply only prospectively,
but because the particular decisions being applied "so change[d] the law that
prospectivity [was] arguably the proper course."
Id at 558-59 (quoting Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 649, 659 (1971) (plurality
opinion)).
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Through its classification of precedent, the Court also was able to
attribute the consistent nonretroactivity of prior fourth amendment de-
cisions to the weight of the reliance and effect factors when in fact the
Court had reached those decisions by relying almost exclusively on its
prior conclusion that retroactive application would not fulfill the deter-
rent purpose of the exclusionary rule. The Court thus avoided its previ-
ous preoccupation with purpose, which had culminated in Peltier's
"knowledge" rule.
Finally, the Court's reformulation of the "clear break" test argua-
bly changed the consequences of the Court classifying a case as a "clear
break with the past." Justice Blackmun noted that for this class of cases,
the reliance and effect factors "virtually compelled a finding of nonret-
roactivity." 114 The "clear break" test seemingly has been transformed
from a threshold question to a classification question whose resolution
will definitively determine the retroactivity issue. Should a fourth
amendment decision be the product of the Court's application of settled
principles, a "jurisdictional" decision, or a decision that fits within none
of the categories of existing precedent, it will operate retroactively. The
only instance in which a fourth amendment ruling will not apply to cases
on direct review underjohnson is if the ruling sought to be applied is a
"clear break with the past.' 15
The Johnson decision clearly reversed the thrust of fourth amend-
ment retroactivity analysis. Althoughjohnson did not expressly overrule
Peltier, it repudiated the Peltier analysis by reinstating a modified "clear
break" threshold test and by dispensing with Peltier's emphasis on the
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule. The result is manifestly at
odds with the Peltier presumption of nonretroactivity. To end any
doubt about the continued efficacy of the Peltier approach, the Court
expressly renounced any inquiry into the subjective state of an arresting
officer's mind for retroactivity purposes.' 16 The Court, however, did
114 Johnson, 457 U.S. at 549-50.
115 See United States v. Robinson, 690 F.2d 869 (1 lth Cir. 1982) (holding fourth amend-
ment aspects of United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) retroactive at
least as to all convictions not yet final when Berry was decided). The Robinson court stated
that, underJohnson,
[i]n deciding the retroactivity of Berry, we need consider only whether Berry
involves a "clear break" with past precedent, and thus falls within the second
of the three [Johnson] categories [of cases]. . . . If not, then Berry merits retro-
active effect (1) because even if Bery fell into the first and third categories
discussed above ["jurisdictional" and "settled principle" cases], those catego-
ries lead to a conclusion of retroactivity, and (2) absent the applicability of
one of the three categories, a decision construing the Fourth Amendment ap-
plies retroactively to all convictions not yet final at the time of the decision.
Robinson, 690 F.2d at 874.
116 Johnson, 457 U.S. at 559-60. The Johnson opinion also recognized that an objective
test, focusing on the knowledge that could reasonably be imputed to the enforcement official,
also is inappropriate because it would reduce retroactivity inquiries to "an absurdity." Id at
560. Under such a theory, the only fourth amendment rulings qualifying for retroactive ap-
1983]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
limit the reach of this reshaping of retroactivity theory. It declined to
extend the Johnson holding to other constitutional provisions or to pass
on the retroactivity test applicable to fourth amendment claims before
the Court on collateral attack."17 Justice Brennan underlinedJohnson's
limitations by expressly conditioning his concurrence in the result on the
understanding that Johnson left undisturbed retroactivity precedents as
applied to finhl convictions. 118
Justice White, writing for the dissent inJohnson, objected to the ma-
jority's "intricate and confusing opinion." ' 1 9 In his view, the Court had
clearly enunciated and consistently applied traditional retroactivity doc-
trine in fourth amendment cases, including Peltier, which he regarded as
controlling.120 The dissent reiterated Peltier's emphasis on the purpose
of a new rule and endorsed the "knowledge" test for resolving retroactiv-
ity issues in exclusionary rule cases. White also asserted that beforeJohn-
son, the same principles governed all retroactivity determinations,
regardless of the adjudicatory process by which the defendant arrived
before the Court.121
Justice White's most fundamental objection to the majority's new
rule was that it failed to resolve the "theoretical" problem of unequal
treatment of similarly situated defendants. He claimed that by distin-
guishing those litigants on direct review from those on habeas for the
purpose of resolving the retroactivity issue, the Court "simply [drew]
what is necessarily an arbitrary line in a somewhat different place than
the Court had previously settled upon."'122 According to White, ine-
quality is unavoidable unless the Court is willing to adopt either pure
retroactivity or pure prospectivity; short of this, he saw no principled
reason for adopting an "abstract procedural approach"' 123 instead of em-
ploying a balancing test that weighs the substantive purpose of the new
rule. Finally, the dissent concluded that the Court's refusal to extend its
asserted resolution of the inequality problem to other than fourth
amendment decisions or to expressly overrule conflicting precedents 124
made clear the inadequacy of the Court's analysis.
plication are those in which the officers violated preexisting guidelines. Such cases, however,
as applications of settled principles, present no retroactivity question. Id
117 Id at 562. The opinion also stated that retroactivity questions in civil cases continue
to be governed by the standard set forth in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07
(1971). See Johnson, 457 U.S. at 563.
118 Johnson, 457 U.S. at 563-64 (Brennan, J., concurring).
119 Id at 566 (White, J., dissenting).
120 Id
121 Id
122 Id at 567.
123 Id at 568.
124 Id
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III
ANALYSIS
TheJohnson decision appears to signal a significant change in the
Court's retroactivity doctrine. The Johnson Court reconsidered its retro-
activity principles and attempted to establish a new rule that courts can
apply in a principled and equitable manner. Like prior retroactivity
doctrine, however, the Johnson opinion fails to set forth a guiding juris-
prudential or legislative rationale for the form of its new rule.
When the Linkletter Court first recognized its general power of pro-
spective limitation in constitutional cases, it set out three factors to
guide resolution of retroactivity decisions. It did not, however, account
for the sudden recognition of a retroactivity issue in terms of either juris-
prudential or legislative needs. Although the Court tried to explain
nonretroactivity as a purely constitutional theory, various Justices have
since acknowledged that they viewed it as a practical tool either to limit
new rules with which they disagreed or to facilitate the expansion of
constitutional rights.125 The Justices' conflicting purposes in employing
the Linkletter test produced inconsistent results and charges of unprinci-
pled decisionmaking. 126 Additionally, the Court's failure to articulate
the real factors behind its retroactivity decisions or to adhere to a princi-
pled rationale for its retroactivity doctrine confused the lower courts.1 27
The Court's refusal to acknowledge that its retroactivity inquiries were
motivated by legislative concerns also resulted in the unequal treatment
of similarly situated defendants. 28
TheJohnson decision does not solve the problems that afflicted the
Court's prior retroactivity doctrine because it fails to define a single
principle to guide future retroactivity analysis. The Court in Johnson
adopts the retroactivity approach taken by Harlan in fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule cases on direct review. Both Johnson and a later
fifth amendment case, Mack v. Oklahoma, 129 demonstrate the Court's in-
tention to use this approach in all areas of constitutional adjudica-
tion.1 30 The new doctrine, however, is justified as a remedy for the prior
doctrine's inadequacies, not as the result of Harlan's jurisprudential
theory.
The Court acknowledges Justice Harlan's concern with the princi-
ples of judicial review, but fails to ground theJohnson reformulation on
the core of Harlan's approach. Harlan viewed the retroactivity issue as a
choice of law question to be resolved by reference to the nature, func-
125 See supra notes 53, 59 and accompanying text.
126 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
127 See generally Hasler, supra note 8.
128 See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
129 103 S. Ct. 201 (1982).
130 See infta notes 151-63 and accompanying text.
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tion, and scope of the adjudicatory process in which the retroactivity
claims arise, not by reference to the purpose of the new rule from which
the litigant seeks to benefit.
By qualifying Harlan's approach with a "clear break" category of
controlling precedent, the Court in Johnson demonstrates that it does not
view that approach as a jurisprudential imperative. The Johnson doc-
trine requires courts to determine as a threshold question whether the
rule sought to be applied is a "clear break" with the past. If deemed a
"new" rule, the Linkletter reliance and effect factors seem to compel non-
retroactive application even to cases on direct review 13 1 because the de-
terrent purpose of the new rule is not served by retroactive effect.
Although this threshold category of cases reconciles past precedent
with the Court's new approach, 132 the concerns that resulted in the
"clear break" precedents are irreconcilable with the principles underly-
ing Harlan's approach. Harlan's jurisprudential theory requires retroac-
tive operation on direct review regardless of the novelty of the decision
sought to be applied or the outcome of the Linkletter balancing test. 133
Thus, the internally inconsistent Johnson decision does not validate
Harlan's retroactivity jurisprudence, but instead represents a compro-
mise among Justices who use the retroactivity doctrine to achieve pur-
poses unrelated to a principled retroactivity theory. The Johnson
majority responded to at least four concerns which required a new
formula for resolving retroactivity issues.
The Johnson Court's stated concern was the inconsistent application
of the Linkletter analysis and the disparate treatment of similarly situated
defendants. An unarticulated factor in the Court's reasoning was the
objection expressed by the Peltier dissent to the presumption of nonretro-
activity in fourth amendment cases and the implications of the Peltier
knowledge rule for the validity of the exclusionary rule in other con-
texts. 134 Finally, the Payton rule itself and the general direction of fourth
131 United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549 (1982); see also supra notes 107-15 and
accompanying text.
132 One wonders whether the Court refused to explicitly overrule its fourth amendment
precedent for fear that it would then be faced with the issue of whetherJohnson applies retro-
actively. This seems unlikely, however, because to benefit from a retroactive application of
Johnson, one still would have to be on direct appeal from a conviction that occurred before the
date of the Johnson decision and seeking the benefit of rules such as Almeida-Sanchez, which
presumably would be applied to relatively recent cases even under Peltier. Thus, few defend-
ants would be able to claim the retroactive benefit ofJohrson.
133 Another indication that the Johnson Court did not found its analysis on Harlan's the-
ory of judicial review was the Court's limitation of the Johnson rule to fourth amendment
exclusionary rule cases. Although the Court's acknowledgement of the flaws of prior prece-
dents may compel it to expand its application of Harlan's approach to other constitutional
areas, it is not so compelled by adherence to Harlan's jurisprudence. Had the Court recog-
nized a jurisprudential imperative to apply all rulings to cases on direct review, it would have
been unable to limit the Johnson doctrine to fourth amendment cases.
134 See supra note 98. Some courts have interpreted the reasoning underlying the Peltier
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amendment law may have affected the Court's analysis.
The various concerns underlying the Johnson majority's restructur-
ing of retroactivity analysis were seemingly satisfied by that decision.
The Johnson rule seems to remedy past abuses, dispense with the Peltier
knowledge rule, and underscore the substantive content of Payton. These
varying concerns, however, may divide the Court in its future attempts
to define and apply retroactivity law in all constitutional contexts.
The Court's failure to develop a single, explicit principle or purpose
for resolving retroactivity issues makes it difficult to predict the future
course of retroactivity law. The Johnson approach, however, clearly will
not put to rest the criticisms directed at prior nonretroactivity results.
The Johnson analysis may create unprincipled decisionmaking and doc-
trinal confusion because it can be applied to yield results reflecting all of
the Court's varying and often conflicting concerns. Moreover, the
Court's reformulation may actually add to the problem of unequal
treatment: in addition to providing for nonretroactivity in "clear
break" cases, the Court creates a procedural distinction between cases
on direct review and cases on collateral attack without justifying the
distinction by judicial theory or a coherent and openly debated weigh-
ing of values. Closer examination demonstrates that the concerns voiced
by Justice Harlan and endorsed by the Johnson Court will continue to
plague the Court.
A. The Potential for Unprincipled Application and Doctrinal
Confusion: Two Readings ofJohnson
1. The Narrow Application: Returning to Nonretroactivity by Expanding
the Scope of the "Clear Break" Test
It is unclear whether a majority of the Court favors the continued
existence of the Harlan approach even in fourth amendment cases.1 5
knowledge rule as a validation of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See United
States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that "evidence is not to be
suppressed under the exclusionary rule where it is discovered by officers in the course of ac-
tions that are taken in good faith and in the reasonable, though mistaken, belief that they are
authorized," and citing Peltier among others in support); United States v. Sotomayor, 592
F.2d 1219, 1226-27 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Under the circumstances of this case and the reasoning of
Peltier and Linkletter we do not believe that the police should be penalized for failure to antici-
pate the later interpretation [of the New York statute at issue].") (footnote omitted); United
States v. Darensbourg, 520 F.2d 985, 989 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding validity of state search
warrant against claim based in part on Aguilar-Spinelli requirements, noting "a more bright-
line rule [than that proposed by the dissent] is needed if police are to apply it day by day and
if we are to pass on their good faith in doing so, as Pe/tier indicates we must"). The Court in
Johnson, however, expressly rejected the government's claim "that new Fourth Amendment
rules must be denied retroactive effect in all cases except those in which law enforcement
officers failed to act in good-faith . . . ." 457 U.S. at 559.
135 In an article written after Peltier in 1975, Professor Beytagh noted that "at present a
comfortable working majority of the justices support the non-retroactivity doctrine as it has
developed during the past decade, although the Court is quite divided. . . on certain thresh-
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For some Justices, the immediate stimulus for the reformulation, the
Peltier knowledge rule, has been eliminated. Justice Brennan, who cast
the deciding concurring vote in United States v. Johnson, 136 seemed partic-
old questions." Beytagh, supra note 8, at 1611. Beytagh expressed concern that because the
Court is less activist, the importance of the retroactivity doctrine would wane. Thus, he
feared that the Court would rest content with its Peltier formulation without addressing the
problems of inequality and lower court confusion. Id at 1611-12.
But Johnson represents a complete change in direction, at least in the fourth amendment
area. The Johnson reformulation can be seen as a compromise between Justices who have in
the past taken very different positions on the retroactivity issue. It is not the result of a new
membership, illustrated by the fact that Justices Harlan, Douglas, and Black, consistent crit-
ics of the Linkletter nonretroactivity approach, have left the Court, while Justice O'Connor, a
supporter of the traditional analysis, has joined the bench. Reference to the former positions
of the Johnson majority and the Justices' stands on the still unresolved habeas issue demon-
strates how unstable the new coalition may be.
The consistent advocates of a Linkletter-Peltier nonretroactivity formula are Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Predictably, these Justices dissented
in Johnson and, with Justices Blackmun and Powell, comprised the majority in Peltier. After
Peltier, Justice Powell adopted the Harlan approach in Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432
U.S. 233, 246 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring). In Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980), a
plurality consisting of Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun found that Burch
v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) (holding unconstitutional conviction of nonpetty criminal
by nonunanimous jury of six), applied retroactively to petitioner, who was before the Court
on direct review. Justices Powell and Stevens concurred in the judgment but would not ac-
cept the plurality's traditional Linkltter analysis, preferring instead to ground their decision
on Harlan's principles. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and White dissented.
Justice Marshall's position in the Brown plurality was curious given his earlier statement in
Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 665 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), that, for the reasons articulated by Harlan, he thought new rules should
apply retroactively to cases on direct review but that he would apply Linkletter to determine
the retroactivity of new rules on collateral attack. By joining the plurality instead of the
Powell concurrence in Brown, Justice Marshall endorsed use of the Linkletter approach instead
of the Harlan theory to find retroactive a case on direct review.
Finally, in Johnson, Justices Blackmun, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens consolidated their
views to form the plurality with Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor in dissent. Justice Brennan concurred on the understanding that the decision
would not disturb retroactivity precedents for final convictions. Justice Brennan in his major-
ity opinion in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), and in his Peltier dissent, indicated that
he was less concerned with the inequality that flows from nonretroactivity, a central concern
of the Johnson plurality, than with reinstating the "clear break" test and reaffirming the vital-
ity of the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 548-49 (1975) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); see also supra note 98. Justice Brennan may have an uncertain future as a
Harlan adherent now that the Pe/tier language has been discredited in Johnson. Justice Black-
mun, as author of Johnson, apparently reversed his Petier position. Justice Stevens adopted
the Harlan view earlier in Brown and reaffirmed his position in Johnson.
Significant differences within the Court also seem to exist on the question of what retro-
activity standard applies to convictions that became final before the date of the rule-changing
case. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 547 n. 10 (1982) (indicating that question of
whether equal treatment requires retroactive application of new constitutional rules to cases
before Court on collateral attack is still under debate); see also id at 563-64 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 665 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
It is unclear whether the status of review question will divide the present coalition and
whether the Justices, Justice Brennan in particular, will react as they did in Johnson to non-
fourth amendment questions.
136 457 U.S. 537 (1982); see infra note 169 and accompanying text.
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ularly concerned with Peltier's presumption of nonretroactivity and the
decision's effect on the exclusionary rule. 137 Whether Brennan also
shares the Johnson plurality's stated remedial purpose in overhauling the
retroactivity doctrine is unclear. 138
Members of the Court also may abandon Harlan's retroactivity ap-
proach in other contexts because they view Payton v. New York 139 as rep-
resentative of a distinct class of fourth amendment cases that alone
merits retroactive effect. Payton, Johnson, and Steagald v. United States, 140
which arguably represent the only recent cases in which the Court has
expanded fourth amendment guarantees, 141 all deal with violations of a
defendant's home.
In Payton, the Court held that the fourth amendment prohibits po-
lice without a warrant or consent from entering a suspect's home to
make a routine felony arrest. The Court characterized both entries to
arrest and entries to search as intrusions that "breach . . . the entrance
to an individual's home."' 4 2 Similarly, in Steagald, the Court held that
absent consent or exigent circumstances, police cannot search a third
party's home for the subject of an arrest warrant without first obtaining
a search warrant.143 The Court has drawn "a firm line at the entrance
to the house 'u 44 for determining the legality of search and seizures
under the fourth amendment.
The Johnson decision, then, can be interpreted as attempting to un-
derscore this "home" distinction. IfJohnson is construed in this manner,
its significance lies in its fourth amendment implications and not in its
reformulation of retroactivity doctrine. By resorting to Harlan's ap-
proach, the Court simply might be indicating its desire to apply Paton
and similar fourth amendment "home" cases retroactively-a result it
137 See supra note 98 and accompanying text; see also supra note 134.
138 Given Justice Brennan's past endorsement of the Linkletter test, his concurrence on the
understanding that Johnson left undisturbed Linkletter precedents for cases on collateral attack,
and the Court's implicit overruling of Peltier, Brennan's continued commitment to the Harlan
approach seems doubtful. See supra note 135.
139 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
140 451 U.S. 204 (1981). The Court applied Steagatd retroactively in Harris v. Georgia,
452 U.S. 901 (1981) (vacating judgment in State v. Harris, 246 Ga. 759, 272 S.E.2d 719
(1980) and remanding for consideration in light of Seagald).
141 See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (restrictive reading of procedural
protections); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (same); New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454 (1981) (same); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (same).
142 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980). The Court went on to emphasize that
[t]he Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of set-
tings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded
by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home .... In
terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the
Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.
Id at 589-90.
143 451 U.S. at 216.
144 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
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would have difficulty drawing from the Linkletter balancing test or the
Peltier rule because of their focus on the deterrent purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule. 145
The Court is able to reformulate its retroactivity analysis in fourth
amendment "home" cases such asjohnson because it has treated fourth
amendment cases as a distinct area of retroactivity law in the past and
thus can confine its reformulation to an area that will present few retro-
activity issues. The Court's recent fourth amendment record suggests
that retroactivity issues will arise only in "home" cases like Payton. By
limiting the Johnson decision to fourth amendment cases, the Court also
can avoid the difficult issue of what standard applies to petitioners seek-
ing the benefit of new rules on habeas corpus because Stone v. Powe1146
effectively precludes habeas review of fourth amendment claims.
Thus, it is not certain whether the Court will apply all fourth
amendment rules retroactively to cases before it on direct review or ex-
pand the Johnson doctrine's applicability to other constitutional contexts
as its stated remedial purpose implies. The Johnson decision can be in-
terpreted to allow a new coalition of Justices to return to the Court's
pre-Peltier nonretroactivity pattern and to limit formal recognition of
Harlan's analysis to fourth amendment cases. This interpretation re-
quires expanding the scope of the "clear break" category of cases and
limitingjohnson to its stated facts. The Johnson Court restates the "clear
break" threshold test so that it compels nonretroactive effect for "new"
rules on the strength of the Linkletter reliance and effect factors. The
flexibility of the "clear break" standard 4 7 permits the Court to classify
virtually any rule as "new" if it chooses to accord that rule nonretroac-
tive effect.
On its stated facts, the Johnson decision establishes that a case
resolving an issue expressly left undecided by the Court should be ap-
plied retroactively if its resolution "rest[s] on both long-recognized prin-
ciples of Fourth Amendment law and the weight of historical
authority."'148 Johnson's effect simply may be to clarify that borderline
cases like Payton, whose rules have been foreshadowed but not expressly
145 The trouble the Court took to retain its fourth amendment Linkletter precedents for
use in "clear break" cases while applying Pay/on retroactively supports this view. The Peltier
Court read Almeida-Sanchez to be "a 'clear break' with the past," see supra note 94 and accom-
panying text, although it was clearly foreshadowed and anticipated by lower courts, see
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 544-47 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Peltier v.
United States, 500 F.2d 985, 988-90 (9th Cir. 1974); supra note 96.
By contrast, theJohnson Court found that Payton was not a "new rule" despite the fact
that the lower state and federal courts split on the issue and of the ten state courts that had
held warrantless arrests in the home unconstitutional, seven had done so on state and federal
grounds. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 575 & nn.2-4 (1980).
146 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
147 See supra note 49.
148 United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 552 (1982).
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laid out, must receive nonretroactive effect. Such a rule satisfies the
Peltier dissent's concern that unless questionable cases are resolved in
favor of retroactivity, law enforcement officers "would have little incen-
tive to err on the side of constitutional behavior."' 49
Although the Johnson majority endorses Harlan's concerns and
adopts his approach for cases before the Court on direct review, the
Court might construeJohnson narrowly to serve a variety of ends. Nar-
rowly applying the Johnson analysis will not, however, satisfy the reme-
dial purpose articulated by the Court in subscribing to Justice Harlan's
critique. Such an interpretation will exacerbate the primary problems
Harlan sought to solve in advocating his retroactivity approach. Failing
to accord cases before the Court on direct review automatic retroactive
effect, as suggested by Harlan, and reverting to the pre-Peltier retroactiv-
ity results, rightfully would be viewed as unprincipled decisionmaking.
The narrow approach also would be difficult to apply consistently be-
cause of the difficulty of administering the "clear break" test.150 Finally,
the nonretroactivity of "clear break" cases and the unexplained distinc-
tion between petitioners on habeas and those before the Court on direct
review would result in continued unequal treatment of similarly situated
defendants.
2. The Broad Reading: Adopting the Harlan Approach for Use in All
Areas of Constitutional Adjudication
Although the Johnson majority may not be wedded to Harlan's ju-
risprudence, it is interested in applying its retroactivity doctrine in a
principled manner and relieving the unequal treatment that character-
ized prior retroactivity law. It is unclear whether a majority of the
Court perceives the new approach as a broad remedy for past retroactiv-
ity problems or merely as a narrower solution to these problems in the
fourth amendment area. The Johnson opinion and the Court's subse-
quent decision in Mack v. Okldhoma 15 1 suggest that the Court indeed in-
tends to apply the Harlan approach outside the realm of fourth
amendment retroactivity analysis. The Johnson Court emphasized the
problems with prior retroactivity law, especially the unequal treatment
inherent in nonretroactivity. In declaring broadly that the "time for
149 Id at 561.
150 The Court seems to have as much difficulty coming to a consensus on what consti-
tutes a "clear break" as it does determining whether the purpose of a rule enhances the relia-
bility of the verdict and would be served by retroactive application. See, e.g., United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 541 (1975); id at 543 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id at 544 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 673 (1973); id at 693 (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); id at 269-71 (Fortas, J., dissenting); id at 257
(Harlan, J., dissenting); supra note 46.
151 103 S. Ct. 201 (1982).
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toleration [of unequal treatment] has come to an end," 152 the Court
enunciated a policy not restricted to alleviating injustices in fourth
amendment cases. 153 The Court acknowledged that even under its new
approach a degree of inequality might result. It asserted, however, that
the approach "ha[s] the power to eliminate the obvious unfairness that
results when [retroactivity doctrine] gives only the most conveniently
situated defendant the retrospective benefit of a newly declared rule."' 54
The Johnson Court referred to Harlan's approach throughout its
analysis, stating that it "embrace[d] Harlan's views in Desist and Mack-
ey" 155 to the extent necessary to decide the case. The Johnson majority
reiterated Harlan's views concerning the Court's retroactivity record
and applied these views to determine whether a retroactivity "question
would be fairly resolved by applying the rule in Payton to all cases still
pending on direct appeal."' 156 Having acknowledged that Harlan's con-
cerns are relevant to all retroactivity issues, the Court cannot easily con-
fine their applicability to fourth amendment cases.
Inferences based on Johnson's fourth amendment context support a
broad rather than a narrow 5 7 interpretation of the decision. It is signif-
icant that the Court selected the area of case law most consistently pre-
sumed nonretroactive to reverse this presumption and declare its
adoption of Harlan's retroactivity ideas. The Johnson majority could
have rejected the nonretroactivity rule formulated in United States v.
Peltier15 8 and given the Payton decision retroactive effect without creat-
ing such doctrinal upheaval.' 59 The Court's complete reversal and re-
formulation in retroactivity analysis indicates its desire to change
retroactivity results in all areas of constitutional law.
The Court's recent refusal to expand fourth amendment guarantees
except in the "home" cases also suggests that it does not intend to limit
theJohnson retroactivity approach to the fourth amendment context. A
reformulation of the fourth amendment retroactivity rule would be vir-
tually meaningless unless the Court intended its expansive language to
apply in other constitutional contexts.
Finally, a subsequent decision reflects the Court's intention to ap-
plyJohnson beyond its explicit bounds. In Mack v. Oklahoma 160 the Court
summarily vacated an Oklahoma state court's judgment that Carter v.
152 United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 556 n.16 (1982).
153 But see supra note 133.
154 Johnson, 457 U.S. at 557 n.17 (1982).
155 Id at 562.
156 Id at 554.
157 See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
158 422 U.S. 531 (1975); see supra notes 82-98 and accompanying text.
159 It is possible to reconcile Peltier to the earlier line of cases by ignoring the Court's
implicit analysis and deemphasizing the knowledge inquiry. See Beytagh, supra note 8, at
1592-94.
160 103 S. Ct. 201 (1982).
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Kentucky 1 61 be denied retroactive effect. Although the Carter rule in-
volved the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the
Court remanded the case "for further consideration in light of United
States v. Johnson. "162 The court vacated the Oklahoma state court deci-
sion without opinion, 163 but the case reflects its intention to apply the
Johnson formula in resolving all future retroactivity questions.
If the Court does expand the Johnson approach's applicability, it is
unclear what form the rule will take. The Court may develop a general
rule mandating retroactive effect in most cases while retaining the flex-
ibility to apply decisions nonretroactively by retaining the "clear break"
category of controlling precedent. If the Court is truly interested in
principled decisionmaking, however, it may disregard Blackmun's three
categories of "controlling precedent" as mere dicta.164
In sum, the Court may apply theJohnson rule only in fourth amend-
ment cases or expand its scope to include all constitutional decisions. It
may retain the expedientJohnson rule or dispense with its categories of
controlling precedent to make application of Harlan's approach on di-
rect review unqualified by a "clear break" distinction. Even if the Court
formulates a retroactivity approach that can be applied in a consistent
and principled manner by rejecting the Linkletter analysis and employ-
ing the Harlan approach in all retroactivity cases, it still must resolve
the problem of its unequal treatment of similarly situated defendants.
B. Unequal Treatment: Another Arbitrary Distinction or a
Principled Response to Judicial Needs?
The Court in United States v. Johnson attempted to remedy the une-
qual treatment inherent in nonretroactivity by applying Justice
Harlan's retroactivity approach to cases before the Court on direct re-
161 450 U.S. 288 (1981) (holding that failure to give requested instruction on a defend-
ant's failure to testify is violation of defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination).
162 Id The Mack dissent indicates that the petitioner specifically relied upon United States
o. Johnson in arguing for retroactivity. 103 S. Ct. 201 (1982). Justice O'Connor, joined in
dissent by Justice Rehnquist, objected to the Court's extension of Johnson without plenary
review to cases arising under the fifth amendment. Id at 201-02 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
163 Id Justice O'Connor also asserted that "[t]he court below will be understandably
confused by the Court's action in vacating the judgment, and remanding to determine the
applicability of a decision that by its explicit terms is restricted to the Fourth Amendment."
Id at 202.
164 Several lower courts, in applyingJohnson, seem to subscribe to this latter view. See
United States v. Martin, 690 F.2d 416, 421 n.4 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying Ross retroactively,
stating that "[g]enerally, we must apply a Supreme Court decision construing the Fourth
Amendment retroactively to all convictions that were not yet final when the decision was
rendered"); see also United States v. Robinson, 690 F.2d 869, 873-74 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (holding
that fourth amendment aspects of United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1982) (en
banc) apply retroactively, at least to all convictions not final at time decision was rendered).
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view. 165 In retaining a "clear break" category of controlling precedent
that required nonretroactivity for "new" rules, however, the Court per-
petuated this unequal treatment. 166 Even if the Court in the future
overrules the "clear break" cases or ignores the "clear break" language
in Johnson as dicta,16 7 it must confront a new form of disparity in treat-
ment based on a petitioner's status of review.
TheJohnson Court created a procedural distinction between peti-
tioners seeking retroactive relief on direct review and those before the
Court on habeas without providing a rationale for treating the two
classes of petitioners differently. This distinction is without foundation
because the Johnson Court failed to define the retroactivity standard that
applies to those fourth amendment cases cognizable on habeas. 168 How-
ever, Justice Brennan's caveat in Johnson 169 and the Justices' positions on
this issue in past cases 170 suggest that the Court will rely on a Linkletter
purpose inquiry to resolve retroactivity questions arising on collateral
attack. The Court seems unwilling to embrace Harlan's choice of law
on habeas because it might foreclose litigants collaterally attacking a
final judgment from receiving the benefit of constitutional protections
that affect the reliability of their convictions.' 71
Although this concern is legitimate, the Court must give a princi-
pled rationale for its procedural distinction or suffer continued charges
that it is drawing arbitrary lines among similarly situated defendants.
The Court must establish either that a defendant seeking relief on direct
review and a defendant collaterally attacking a final judgment are not
similarly situated or that a classification based on status of review is
165 See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 547-48 (1982); see also supra notes 101-06
and accompanying text.
166 See supra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
167 See supra note 164.
168 Johnson did not require the Court to decide the issue of what standard it will apply on
habeas corpus both because the petitioner was before the Court on direct review and because
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), makes the issue moot in fourth amendment cases. Simi-
larly, the Court in Mack v. Oklahoma, 103 S. Ct. 201 (1982), did not face the issue because
the petitioner sought relief on direct review.
169 Brennan stated that he joined the plurality on the understanding that the "decision
leaves undisturbed our retroactivity precedents as applied to convictions final at the time of
decision." United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 563-64 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring).
170 See supra note 135.
171 Critics of Harlan's approach contend that automatic nonretroactive or prospective
application of new rules on collateral attack will deny litigants on habeas the benefit of rules
that may affect the reliability of the verdict. To this the Johnson Court responded that
[t]he logic of our ruling, however, is not inconsistent with our precedents giv-
ing complete retroactive effect to constitutional rules whose purpose is to over-
come an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-
finding function. . . . Depending on the constitutional provision involved,
additional factors may warrant giving a particular ruling retroactive effect
beyond those cases pending on direct review.
457 U.S. at 562 n.21.
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reasonable in relation to legitimate judicial and societal needs. 172
To justify distinguishing between defendants based on their status
of review, the Court should explicitly adopt Harlan's focus on the adju-
dicatory process by which the defendant came before the Court. 173 Jus-
tice Harlan based his two-tiered approach on his belief that the nature,
function, and scope of the two methods of review are fundamentally
different and thus petitioners availing themselves of the habeas remedy
are in a different class than those before the court on direct review.
Harlan also asserted that society's legitimate interest in the finality of
judgments outweighed other considerations and made such a distinction
necessary. 174 Although Harlan's view is subject to dispute, 175 it is sup-
ported by the Court's recent decisions limiting the availability and scope
of federal habeas corpus relief.176
Furthermore, although a complete adoption of Justice Harlan's ret-
roactivity theory would not resolve the underlying philosophical differ-
ences among Justices, it would allow them to express their concerns
within a principled and easily applied analytical framework. In
Harlan's view, the Court's function on direct review requires that it ap-
ply the law "as it is at the time, not as it once was,"' 77 but the Court's
choice of law on habeas is not similarly restricted. The Harlan ap-
proach would enable the Court to weigh itspresent conception of the role
of habeas review and society's interest in finality against the individual
litigant's interest in receiving new constitutional protections that may
affect the integrity of the truth-finding process. Thus, this approach is
flexible enough to accommodate the interests of individual members of
172 Comment, supra note 43, at 242-43.
173 For a view that both nonretroactivity and Harlan's distinction between defendants
based on their status of review violate the equal protection clause, see Comment, supra note
43.
174 See supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
175 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
176 See, e.g., United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (Sykes cause and actual prejudice
requirements govern petitions of federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976)); Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) (Sykes cause and actual prejudice standard for excusing procedural
defaults held applicable even in cases in which constitutional error may have affected truth-
finding function at trial); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (requiring total exhaustion of
state remedies before federal courts will consider habeas corpus petitions); Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (state prisoner barred by procedural default from raising constitu-
tional claim on direct appeal may only proceed on § 2254 federal habeas claim if showing of
cause for and actual prejudice from default is made); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)
(federal habeas corpus relief unavailable for claim that illegally seized evidence was intro-
duced at trial where state has provided opportunity for full and fair litigation of fourth
amendment claim). See generally Olsen,JudicialProposals to Limit theJurisdictional Scope of Federal
Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Consideration of the Claims of State Prisoners, 31 BUFFALO L. REV.
301 (1983); Comment, Lundy, Issac and Frady: A Trilogy of Habeas Corpus Restraint, 32 CATH.
U.L. REV. 169 (1983).
177 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 681 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see supra
notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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the Court with respect to the choice of law on habeas, yet it clarifies
what factors the Court is weighing and why it is doing so.
In arriving at his choice of law, Harlan stated that "the relevant
competing policies properly balance out to the conclusion that, given the
current broad scope of constitutional issues cognizable on habeas, it is sounder, in
adjudicating habeas petitions, generally to apply the law prevailing at
the time a conviction became final."'' 7 8 The Court's retreat from its ex-
pansive reading of the habeas writ and its imposition of new limits on
habeas relief,179 however, require a reevaluation of the balance Harlan
struck. Once a new balance is found, it can be applied consistently to all
litigants until such time as the Court is compelled by a new interpreta-
tion of the scope of habeas to reexamine its position. Thus, although the
Harlan approach contains a balancing inquiry, it is capable of consis-
tent application. In sum, Harlan's approach is responsive to the chang-
ing contours of the writ, and can satisfy the Justices' unique concerns
with respect to the choice of law on habeas within a principled frame-
work for decision.
CONCLUSION
In United States v. Johnson, the Supreme Court attempted to "re-
think" its retroactivity doctrine and thereby resolve the problems that
have plagued the doctrine since its formulation in Linkletter v. Walker.
The Court, however, neglected to address the source of these problems.
Although it adopted Justice Harlan's choice of law in fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule cases arising on direct review, the Court again
failed to enunciate a single purpose or rationale for its new approach to
retroactivity issues.
Until the Court develops a principled theory to guide its retroactiv-
ity analysis, the Johnson formula will suffer from the same incoherent
and inconsistent application that characterized the Linkletter balancing
test. Furthermore, if the Court is to avoid continued charges of drawing
arbitrary procedural distinctions among similarly situated defendants, it
must establish that defendants benefitting from a new rule on direct
review are not in the same class as habeas petitioners who are denied the
protection of the rule. In the alternative, the Court must justify the
Johnson procedural distinction as a reasonable means to further legiti-
mate judicial and societal ends.
Justice Harlan's approach to retroactivity issues provides the neces-
sary principled framework for resolution of retroactivity issues. It
clearly mandates that all constitutional decisions be applied to convic-
tions not yet final on the date of the decision. Harlan's approach re-
178 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 688-89 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
179 See supra note 176.
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quires that the choice of law on habeas be resolved by a balancing test
that is responsive to the changing bounds of the habeas writ and allows
the Court to consider forthrightly the concerns peculiar to retroactivity
questions on habeas review. The Harlan approach is capable of consis-
tent application and provides a legitimate rationale for distinguishing
among defendants according to their procedural posture. The Court
would do well to go beyond johnson's adoption of the result of Justice
Harlan's retroactivity analysis to an endorsement, in all areas of consti-
tutional adjudication, of the theoretical construct that supports that re-
sult.
Julie R. O'Sullivan

